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All rights reserved.Stone is a trademark of Adobe Systems Incorporated.Stone Serif SemiboldStoneSerifStoneSerif-Semibold^&*_4^s:u6k] + K { c +  HZEKsY7S}uGZ[CT)#  U ! !o!"C"|""#8##$Y%%1%&8'''((())*G*\*+,,,,-<-..^/://00'0p00011M1122-2B23w34^55V66_67578w889i: :;,;Z;<~<<=$=>>??@M@@AAAAAAAAAABB BBB$B-B7BABKBUB_BiBqB{BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBCC CCC%C-C6C>CFCOCWC`CiCqCyCCCC*w+*(HDc ,`l[~l`,$ gcchhcbid7ЋwIIT1" WWSr`td` WWSr`tj/2]Ho]]In]=y=ljjojj"czv wӨq%g)= e@ljrƭ Yf]Uk`Z|&7I/Rcklsir@ET~n(yƊ1rh!@h_So NSbdjY݄11D5PF6P\l[ZFFZ\ll[ZFFZ\l\$TS2$4"TS1"3Ie.VA O _kVe@)Qᷖʯ Siwd iEhb64jĩlEn[Oeٳ&HQtfpD00;cGXɯf58:\^Y`f`GXHڻ(*J:H(TGF[gsW؆ov6}o։(0pȊ% KE{n[8zߪ`;'KV ?1wTP7Z`2,NEjlw"ζߤw_ 7a}wX7(%"݃ȏǓ́F=\KdnE3ve騨vuU[m^)P@V(.p&VTPw$Ns _lTl`mwf O9J7pg@_ugznlW]} ŋӬ!H 2` (_R?Dy(-6 1 lyx|pdp|xyi^lx/ߴd+QgVF&/U:O4cD<F?(UH5/>oZ].`.=rԠY!,wDbwlyx|pdp|xyi^xIR 7">}lɰl!AwIp2axT9fwΠ^T}pRpdL8ѣVD5lyx|pdp|xyh_?l!Nܱ1yx|pdp|xyi^lϪ^idΠ^T}pRpdL,*ѤVD5I/dOчyx|qK&jk+#62KC"@/>oZ].`.=q룡Lnټ!!p|xyh_lϪ_hdlyx|pEElyx|pdp|xyh_lЪ^ht!lyx|pdp|xyi^lϪ^ivI!lyx|pDzj_muqgvrU}ÜϟW㋪̭!' p|xyi^lϪ^iuM]e)7)GOalm^^BEkltalyx|pl !pIo2bxT:fklyx|pdp|xyi^!PPWulfWEruxjq}UlxVpp|xyi^lϪ^iỴIiKlو}jxur7/T3}lDzi]Nruxjp}Ul>p$)H=i .\ /5/\K){D!$oX]%1,'> s)1-<TYZJ,E(3T[ 0^IBQVJ6Rzp,w#k%THտڰGL !+VLp-p-ʰp|xyi^lϪ^iI !lyx|pEu\~l}jxur3FFev1'PlW9 $^]^sl˨tBpS"T$R"V)V4_v`v18"Omj)'C?F³{l܆uzKc#c$cM=I2wϢʍ70,Vls`l 0&+ely^;5sBWlpZlZdrλT!`E`elTY^㋪!!_h9kmƯqMirlvK0,p|xyh_lfަhP0ʑe*`Dp0gc9((Us4OJyz̬bvswZsssUAU4j̝Vz^|LJj X')*K6L**Y.݋wP`_w bR-imTϼoQf9>.ϰٰѣaյQ#ոʵć}Ǵʰť9#*ѱ+7TѲǏmpX6!Ķ<=d;$g76w!57MWe[*^ 繮z^JfT{{_{K&ldpg^e' '9 !3ͺorp)o8V wIPH 69k<˗v|reoO%u. û\Mat~yv!]s(zu]pzmdxp~OrF\:F>Xp|xyihlͪOhbDGK|CPJe=2LѺ!NXRDlh` R!;[d&<|^m$]zv|I % ^;Lmb xuVDǏ<1_}AL>rˎы56wcs_{K&ldp~p|xyhhlmiؔEFSp|xyiolhhml9CeY`,w%&$Un4GlYp|xyhhlhi$( blm`bkkb,w%&d[\qdruurL$DVn4GlY blm_ckkbDBw s_{K&ldp~p|xyhhlhi0_F[ (.opec`\EA= Hw0s_{K&ldp~p|xyhhlhi0,uBؐK@Sp|xyhploi>ِK@Sp|xyiolhhml:Ie]dfpB:Ee]gUn4GlYp|xyhhloiы,ucؔEFSp|xyiolhhml9CeY`Un4GlYp|xyhhlniZ!!6 -5a=5( *}8;2KWTR6\$c6y!yE d%fhpJ{0':5CHiX`Vn4GlYp|xyihlªZhd<!5q|xyhZlªhiC.<5'8 !3ˬJYeX*_z]Q,wUn4GlYp|xyhhl^i 󜯧uDk|||ss|lt$aQRTvS䱚z~9=_T¨[aX]b)=\:PoNTtWeraSRẐprs,;elyhxmx@Xn-utq=nҍwUY{{(Un4GlY1`gI@0Un4HlYm(=rnwvi\w1|l_nA GjlKrvihioV ϣilƇ+h?u@D{oJ* #mlsd6 &^fmu`lRV*^kblbnj$V»Clv_fF7yvc\'#vlp^H(c6ydhyfzZwqll»~Kp 2ڦPpYye?Q-7sw"ۂCОU̜֝TuUE}iMxxiBDkLwvsws=swJ@w]LDԕ͞M}UTza@U>`xCwZ;K Bx`z ozuj\thfediHg_Ofg||{|ɬ°*+*(` |,vaxl~xva|,`-$ chhbchib8]y͐@"4>=dmx:Ŧ$uɱDZɏT{ikȰ–Աzٗ@¦cǿ<_z2m[{E$ Γ\cy}fmY8+u~5+^~<\JD}2h{kuvPwR{ 5PF6PUҸ~!xalĥtJs11w~lvJZ ^D8^8!p|xyg^lΪ_i88!6y"ci'll{ZbXDuN-X.2|+Lqxrazqb1eb+sc@aviŸgrufiappMR_mmd)3X03YRY`KaYu`]izX}}{wO|ƴKCu{|xyhêێia|xysi̋!_s'̵ı|xysi݂ibܒ|sdb=:>|wyhêێi\\?S\Nܙ޿Cˆq~fɲā|g97{|za_ld{w=<RDCT58:NPvŰxwIބqq~fwy|cqlgŽDˆq~fwy|cqlg97{ex|za_ffld{ywg}=<TDDTSETfld{ywg}=<e_qaz|xe{G*+ bihccgib=7ߵl WQɵ-FP03i}rvdhl=>hcC= =*)==*)>UPU -kyGZ|[A*+UPPU -kyGZ|[A*i -kyGZ|[A*=*݋wPPT* -kyGZ|[A*i -kyGZ|[A*ff!ffT 2'}{v ruq; vr, 2'}{v ruq; v* bihccgib  bihccgib  bihccgibu111D5PF6P\l[ZFFZ\ll[ZFFZ\l\$TS2$4"TS1"32"TS1"3l[ZFFZ\l*&+!JiPSVXER6L ΗȎs`_}}upo\p⓶P. gbdhhcbivTGcwpqtxzorx{-4vT'xtqptuw%'44'$;C$;+L`4K momdiwstumJcXI|~~~}˾ʑ+\GͲDz^T=LD|d/ Udnmdcnmb,< npoompqln npoompql͹:Zqooqrooq-¸^UU\\VU^Qkس}-(tiqq}oz}lͩbdcbTU-wwpssvu&'-vxossvu%'%Gwvp|ts}Uhprmjgnð;_$;$;]\||\|?lRհfl !Auxk4Ip2axT9fwΠ^T|pSpdL8ѣUE5lȆjmY}`rjynlW]up|xyh_dŷ].hmk{ohZ.nLvbyQXk¬{y{k-Uppgp}ʟZ~_޷l !pIo2bxT:fs#J/lyx|pH`?p|xyi^\ /5/Ca?9RB7l98_'7O61fWr\K){jN1+_TGNKLOcvw= g<qfɰr-!B.i}rrml {B 5jvr}i!ѤVD5vC#92jT!4BIpc2awT9fwΣ^T}pRodL8dŷ/Z"B-X*J2LkU ᬵ̙1V4laeLE_`Gh8>W m ¼\Mat~xL._\Q^tѣZ.yŌu|sdoP&}/̧I6SpffpYFV]xX}p~[ťQ9#[*hMl+H7TѲ,w0Un4GlYp|xyhhlhi0vws_{K&ldpn%Gepp|xyhhlhis?WZ!wgNN`QMa=5HP`NMfkxBsh,0kho`7?qSh}$fYhp8! 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Aggar)-12.1(wal and Edwar)7.6(d A. Fogar)-9.9(ty)]TJ /F4 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 10 0 0 10 127.1811 488.7041 Tm [(1)-1197.4(Introduction)]TJ /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc -0.0061 Tw 9 0 0 9 127.1811 468.2041 Tm (It is standard fare in political science or political economy to charact\ erize)Tj 0.0054 Tc -0.00549 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(the nature of political and economic systems in the aftermath of some cr\ it-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0119 Tw T*(ical juncture \320 such as the \322postwar era,\323 the \322post-Cold Wa\ r era,\323 \322post-)Tj 0.00301 Tc -0.0031 Tw T*(September 11,\323 and the like. Analyses that highlight these critical j\ unctures)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.00661 Tw T*(all face the same questions: do we know yet whether this juncture was in\ )Tj 0.02341 Tw T*(fact critical? Even if it was, has enough time passed for us to undertak\ e a)Tj 0.10229 Tw T*(valid assessment of the shape of the world in its aftermath? Skeptics of\ )Tj 0.1889 Tw T*(hasty assessments may recall Zhou En-Lai\325s famous response to Henry)Tj 0.0724 Tw T*(Kissinger\325s question about the meaning of the French Revolution nearl\ y)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(two hundred years on \320 \322It is too soon to tell.\323 )Tj 0.01311 Tc -0.0132 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (In pursuing an analysis of a new form of trade and commercial relation-)Tj 0.0123 Tc -0.01241 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (ships that takes as its starting point the continued debility of the mul\ tilat-)Tj 0.0065 Tc -0.00661 Tw T*(eral institutions and processes of trade cooperation, we are surely temp\ ting)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1153 Tw T*(the fate of those who attempt to slice a loaf of bread that is only half\ -)Tj 0.07581 Tw T*(baked. And surely the GATT/WTO regime has proved durable, surviving)Tj 0.01109 Tc -0.01131 Tw T*(many past threats to its primacy in international commercial cooperation\ ,)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1947 Tw T*(whether from protectionism or regionalism. Yet although we take the)Tj 0.0137 Tc -0.01379 Tw T*(failure of WTO talks in Seattle in 1999 \(and subsequent lack of progres\ s in)Tj 0.0076 Tc -0.00771 Tw T*(the Doha Round\) as our critical juncture, we are not assuming that inte\ rre-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.02451 Tw T*(gionalism, or regionalism, or bilateralism, or any other type of \320ism\ , will)Tj 0.0453 Tw T*(replace multilateralism. Rather, we ask whether, in a world in which the\ )Tj 0.00459 Tc -0.0047 Tw T*(WTO still operates but perhaps ceases to evolve in a meaningful way, int\ er-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.10561 Tw T*(regionalism will emerge as a viable alternative form of institutionalize\ d)Tj 0.0517 Tw T*(economic integration. 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But ess\ en-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.2326 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(tial precursors to these possible explanations are the initial necessary\ )Tj 0.15781 Tw T*(conditions. Speci\336cally, the pursuit of interregionalism implies at l\ east)Tj 0.0004 Tc -0.0005 Tw T*(three conditions: \(1\) continuing integration of the world economy; \(2\ \) con-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.3909 Tw T*(tinuing uncertainty surrounding the multilateral WTO process; and )Tj 0.01421 Tc -0.0143 Tw T*(\(3\) continuing support among at least some constituencies for the inst\ itu-)Tj 0.0096 Tc -0.0097 Tw T*(tionalization of stable, rule-bound international commercial relationshi\ ps.)Tj 0.00771 Tc -0.0078 Tw T*(While, as noted above, we take the \336rst two of these conditions as gi\ ven, it)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1859 Tw T*(is the third that we have sought to illuminate in this book. We have)Tj 0.00459 Tc -0.0047 Tw T*(framed the conceptual evolution of interregionalism as a possible synthe\ sis)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.5197 Tw T*(of market-driven globalism and politically-driven regionalism. Our )Tj 0.0083 Tw T*(focus has been on exploring the dynamics of the interplay of market and)Tj 0.27789 Tw T*(political actors to understand whether interregionalism represents an)Tj 0.25191 Tw T*(equilibrium policy outcome that might supplement or even supplant)Tj 0.16251 Tw T*(multilateralism in organizing and governing the international political)Tj 0.0056 Tc 0 Tw T*(economy.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.3399 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (We have concentrated on European-connected arrangements for a)Tj 0.01891 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (number of interrelated reasons. First and foremost, the European focus i\ s)Tj 0.1019 Tw T*(practical: there are several cases of EU-centered interregionalism, whic\ h)Tj 0.0898 Tw T*(allows us to compare a number of contending hypotheses regarding EU)Tj 0.04269 Tw T*(motivations and interregional outcomes across enough cases to allow an)Tj 0.0318 Tw T*(initial assessment of the most important sets of variables driving inter\ re-)Tj 0.004 Tc -0.0041 Tw T*(gional outcomes. Second, at an empirical level, an EU focus also puts at\ the)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0843 Tw T*(center of the analysis the \322necessary\323 cases of interregionalism. \ Because)Tj 0.09579 Tw T*(Europe is by far the most active and successful region in pursuing both)Tj 0.0126 Tc -0.0127 Tw T*(internal and external innovations in institution-building and governance\ ,)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.06931 Tw T*(we would face a great deal of skepticism about both the conceptual and)Tj 0.0737 Tw T*(real-world viability of interregionalism if we were to fail to \336nd a \ stable)Tj 0.1445 Tw T*(basis of support for interregionalism in EU trade policy and outcomes.)Tj 0.0173 Tw T*(Third, this point partially motivates our analysis of both EU trade pref\ er-)Tj 0.35471 Tw T*(ences and EU-counterpart regime outcomes: we wish to understand)Tj 0.0119 Tc -0.01199 Tw T*(whether there is an achievable equilibrium among trade policy inputs and\ )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.00909 Tw T*(regime outputs that would support interregionalism. It is also one reaso\ n)Tj 0.0986 Tw T*(why we have given considerable attention to the notion of counterpart)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(coherence: if interregionalism is to be more than a particular option fo\ r EU)Tj 0.00439 Tc -0.0045 Tw T*(commercial policy, there must at least be the possibility that other reg\ ional)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(blocs will pursue similar arrangements among themselves.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.25101 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Before comparing our initial expectations with case \336ndings to see)Tj 0.15311 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (whether there is a clear and consistent basis for an interregional trade\ )Tj 0.035 Tw T*(policy, we \336rst review the basis of comparison and the actual \336ndi\ ngs of)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(the various cases.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0757 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Each of the authors in this book focuses on the EU and a counterpart)Tj -0.0063 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (region to determine which factors have had the greatest effect on interr\ e-)Tj 0.14549 Tw T*(gional processes and outcomes over time for that particular case. They)Tj 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8 0 0 8 127.181 663.1211 Tm (208)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 2.6057 0 Td (EU Trade Strategies)Tj ET 1 g /R14 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R9 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (10EUTS-CH08\(207-240\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 208)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R14 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 139 0 obj 6614 endobj 140 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 141 0 obj << /Length 142 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R14 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R10 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.0011 Tc -0.00121 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 126.1811 638.3862 Tm (highlight three regime qualities in particular: its strength, its nature\ , and its)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.04849 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(delineation of Europe\325s commercial treatment of the counterpart regio\ n.)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(\(See section 3 for an elaboration of each of these three regime element\ s.\))Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0322 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (The factors that the authors consider as possible explanations for their\ )Tj 0.01401 Tc -0.01421 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (observed interregional regime outcomes fall into two broad categories: E\ U)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0527 Tw T*(motivations and counterpart characteristics. Of the two, EU motivations)Tj 0.0369 Tw T*(are more directly comparable across cases, as the same sets of public an\ d)Tj 0.00951 Tc -0.0096 Tw T*(private sector actors as well as general systemic and ideational inclina\ tions)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(exist \320 but are likely to vary in their in\337uence \320 across cases\ .)Tj 0.0009 Tc -0.00101 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Brie\337y, the authors consider four general approaches to explain Europ\ ean)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.22211 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (motivations regarding international commercial policy in general and)Tj 0.0106 Tc -0.0107 Tw T*(interregionalism in particular. First is a pluralist interest group hypo\ thesis:)Tj 0.01311 Tc -0.0132 Tw T*(EU policy is a function of the mobilization of and competition among rel\ -)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.017 Tw T*(evant interest groups through lobbying at the national and supranational\ )Tj 0.0036 Tc -0.00369 Tw T*(levels. In this view, those interests best able to impose their pure ind\ ividual)Tj 0.01019 Tc -0.0103 Tw T*(preferences \320 or the compromise preferences of an aggregated grouping\ on)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.06799 Tw T*(EU trade policy, whether through superior resources, strategies, politic\ al)Tj 0.0161 Tc -0.0162 Tw T*(connections, and the like \320 will see these preferences re\337ected in\ EU trade)Tj 0.00391 Tc -0.004 Tw T*(policy toward other regions. Second, a bureaucratic politics hypothesis \ sug-)Tj 0.0117 Tc -0.0118 Tw T*(gests that a struggle among the EU\325s supranational and intergovernmen\ tal)Tj 0.0071 Tc -0.0072 Tw T*(institutions will determine EU international commercial policy. Each ins\ ti-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0643 Tw T*(tution has a primary interest in task expansion or retention, and so wil\ l)Tj 0.01669 Tc -0.0168 Tw T*(work within the EU\325s existing distribution of institutional powers to\ push)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1656 Tw T*(commercial policies that favor its own bureaucratic interest. Our third)Tj 0.008 Tc -0.0081 Tw T*(approach is actually two separate potential explanations focusing on int\ er-)Tj 0.00661 Tc -0.0067 Tw T*(national systemic factors. The \336rst derives from a standard realist a\ pproach)Tj 0.01131 Tc -0.0114 Tw T*(to international relations: the EU as a unit responds to the structure o\ f the)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.09531 Tw T*(international system in formulating its international economic policies,\ )Tj 0.01401 Tc -0.0141 Tw T*(pushing those policies that promote the EU\325s collective economic secu\ rity)Tj 0.0061 Tc -0.0062 Tw T*(as well as its global structural power \(via the use of relational power\ \) in ties)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0468 Tw T*(with individual countries and regions. The second derives from the neo-)Tj 0.01019 Tc -0.0103 Tw T*(liberal institutionalist tradition, focusing on states\325 interest in n\ esting sub-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.45081 Tw T*(global commercial agreements within the overarching global WTO)Tj -0.0062 Tw T*(framework. The fourth approach highlights social constructivist concepts\ )Tj 0.1031 Tw T*(of ideas and identity. From this vantage point, EU external commercial)Tj 0.01601 Tc -0.0161 Tw T*(policies are determined by the overarching need to construct \322Europe\323\ by)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.16051 Tw T*(de\336ning its internal and external identity through relations with non\ -)Tj 0.0056 Tc 0 Tw T*(Europeans.)Tj 0.0004 Tc 0.02029 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Counterpart characteristics, while amenable to placement in very general\ )Tj 0.0849 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (categories, are somewhat less directly comparable, given the political, \ eco-)Tj 0.2905 Tw T*(nomic, and socio-cultural diversity both across and within counterpart)Tj -0.01669 Tc -0.00011 Tw T*(regions. These broad categories of counterpart characteristics include t\ he other)Tj 0.0004 Tc 0.0305 Tw T*(region\325s preferences, power, and coherence. Counterpart preferences c\ an to)Tj 0.0005 Tc 0.2383 Tw T*(some extent be analysed through applying the hypotheses of European)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 8 0 0 8 274.1225 663.1211 Tm (Vinod K. Aggarwal and Edward A. Fogarty)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 19.5239 0 Td (209)Tj ET 1 g /R14 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R10 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (10EUTS-CH08\(207-240\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 209)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R14 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 142 0 obj 7017 endobj 143 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 144 0 obj << /Length 145 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R14 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R4 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 0 Tr 8 0 0 8 127.181 663.1211 Tm (210)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 2.6057 0 Td (EU Trade Strategies)Tj /F2 1 Tf -0.01511 Tc -0.00169 Tw 9 0 0 9 127 638.3862 Tm (motivations to the other region. Given the generally low level of instit\ utional-)Tj 0.0004 Tc 0.06371 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(ized cooperation within counterpart regions, however, it is something of\ a)Tj 0.1756 Tw T*(stretch to apply approaches that assume a well-de\336ned set of aggregat\ ed)Tj -0.0036 Tc -0.0132 Tw T*(regional preferences. Thus the authors focus on the preferences of indiv\ idual)Tj 0.0004 Tc 0.0033 Tw T*(countries and actors within the region \320 particularly those expected \ to have)Tj -0.01241 Tc -0.00439 Tw T*(the greatest in\337uence on region-wide views. Notions of counterpart po\ wer are)Tj 0.0004 Tc 0.18311 Tw T*(similarly fraught with complication when aggregated to a regional level.\ )Tj 0.09019 Tw T*(Therefore, the authors similarly disaggregate these regions to focus on \ the)Tj 0.09219 Tw T*(power of individual countries in the counterpart, with an eye to how thi\ s)Tj -0.0096 Tc -0.0072 Tw T*(power improves the bargaining position of the country and region as a wh\ ole)Tj -0.011 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(\320 and how it affects the EU\325s motivations.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.12711 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Finally, the authors consider the initial coherence of the counterpart)Tj 0.0128 Tc -0.01289 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (region in terms of the extent to which the region is self-de\336ned, the\ scope)Tj 0.0038 Tc -0.00391 Tw T*(of intraregional commerce, the extent to which existing political-econom\ ic)Tj 0.01511 Tc -0.0152 Tw T*(manifestations of the region re\337ect current understandings of the \322\ poten-)Tj 0.0127 Tc -0.0128 Tw T*(tial\323 region, and the degree of institutionalization of any existing \ regional)Tj 0.0152 Tc -0.0153 Tw T*(regime. While we consider these counterpart characteristics as inputs in\ to)Tj 0.007 Tc -0.0071 Tw T*(interregional regime outcomes \320 for they surely cannot be ignored \320\ we are)Tj 0.01109 Tc -0.0112 Tw T*(particularly interested in noting whether and how the experience of nego\ -)Tj 0.0137 Tc -0.01379 Tw T*(tiating and establishing interregional commercial agreements with the EU\ )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.04111 Tw T*(encourages counterpart regions to coalesce both economically and polit-)Tj 0.02071 Tw T*(ically, and perhaps to adopt organizational forms of regional governance\ )Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(similar to those of the EU over time.)Tj 0.0116 Tc -0.0117 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (In the introduction, we outlined some initial expectations regarding the\ )Tj 0.0032 Tc -0.0033 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (relationships among our outcomes of interest \(regime strength, nature, \ and)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0618 Tw T*(EU commercial treatment of the counterpart\) and sets of variables high-\ )Tj 0.0155 Tw T*(lighted in each of the hypotheses regarding EU motivations. To recapitu-\ )Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(late, these expectations were as follows: )Tj 0 Tc 0 Tw 2.5556 TL T*(\320)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.23759 Tw 1.3333 0 Td (Interest group hypothesis)Tj /F2 1 Tf 11.5533 0 Td (. We expected the variables relevant to this)Tj 0.1002 Tw -11.5533 -1.2778 Td (hypothesis to be very important for the strength of the regime, least)Tj 0.0049 Tc -0.0051 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(important for the nature, and important for commercial treatment type.)Tj 0 Tc 0 Tw -1.3333 -1.2778 Td (\320)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc -0.0069 Tw 1.3333 0 Td (Bureaucratic politics hypothesis)Tj /F2 1 Tf 14.0831 0 Td (. We expected these variables to be some-)Tj 0.00349 Tc -0.0036 Tw -14.0831 -1.2778 Td (what important for the strength of the regime, important for the nature,\ )Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(and least important for the commercial treatment type.)Tj 0 Tc 0 Tw -1.3333 -1.2778 Td (\320)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.00819 Tc -0.0083 Tw 1.3333 0 Td (Systemic hypotheses: balancing and nesting.)Tj /F2 1 Tf 19.6293 0 Td (We expected power and secur-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1758 Tw -19.6293 -1.2778 Td (ity considerations to be most important for strength of the regime,)Tj 0.002 Tc -0.0022 Tw T*(somewhat important for the nature, and most important for commercial)Tj 0.0083 Tc -0.00841 Tw T*(treatment type. We expected nesting considerations to be important for)Tj 0.01199 Tc -0.0121 Tw T*(the strength of the regime, very important for the nature of the regime,\ )Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(and very important for commercial treatment.)Tj 0 Tc 0 Tw -1.3333 -1.2778 Td (\320)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc -0.0041 Tw 1.3333 0 Td (Constructivist hypothesis)Tj /F2 1 Tf 11.2145 0 Td (. 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The cases are presented in order of their interregion\ al)Tj 0.0056 Tc 0 Tw T*(\322purity.\323 )Tj /F4 1 Tf 0.0058 Tc -0.006 Tw 2.2222 TL T*(EU\320Southern Cone)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.3002 Tw 1.6111 TL T*(The EU\320MERCOSUR relationship is, as J\232rg Faust asserts, the closes\ t)Tj 0.2847 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(approximation of \322pure interregionalism\323 among our cases. It is th\ e )Tj 0.0428 Tw T*(only instance in which two relatively coherent, self-de\336ned, and high\ ly-)Tj 0.0103 Tc -0.01041 Tw T*(institutionalized regional blocs have been negotiating a commercial agre\ e-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.18559 Tw T*(ment on a one-to-one basis. EU\320MERCOSUR interregionalism is still a)Tj 0.1515 Tw T*(process rather than a full-\337edged regime, but the existence of a prot\ o-)Tj 0.1123 Tw T*(regime in EMIFCA, the institution under whose aegis negotiations con-)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(tinue, provides a basis on which to analyse this case. )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.00439 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (While a \336nal EU\320MERCOSUR agreement has yet to emerge, the general)Tj 0.0135 Tc -0.0136 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (outlines of the regime are beginning to come into focus. The two sides a\ re)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.0009 Tw T*(moving toward a strong regime, both in terms of institutionalization and\ )Tj 0.23151 Tw T*(rule bindingness. Though EMIFCA currently lacks a secretariat, it has)Tj 0.03951 Tw T*(spawned a number of relevant committees, subcommittees, and working)Tj 0.03619 Tw T*(groups empowered to work out both political and technical details of an)Tj 0.0071 Tc -0.0072 Tw T*(agreement. The rules expected to emerge from this process will be bindin\ g,)Tj 0.0065 Tc -0.00661 Tw T*(with a dispute-settlement mechanism to mediate con\337icts over applicat\ ion)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(of these rules. )Tj 0.03371 Tc 0.02139 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (The nature of the EU\320MERCOSUR regime will be broad and develop-)Tj 0.02499 Tc -0.0085 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (mental. While the initial stages of interregional cooperation in the ear\ ly)Tj 0.02071 Tc -0.0042 Tw T*(1990s encompassed mostly political rather than commercial matters, the)Tj 0.03371 Tc 0.1391 Tw T*(two sides have since negotiated on a wide range of issues, including)Tj 0.0266 Tw T*(trade \(across nearly all sectors, as required by WTO rules\), investmen\ t,)Tj 0.0179 Tc -0.0014 Tw T*(aid, and property rights. There is a developmental focus to these negoti\ a-)Tj 0.03371 Tc 0.0092 Tw T*(tions, but beyond a modest amount of aid, the main thrust of the EU\325s\ )Tj 0.03349 Tc -0.017 Tw T*(\322developmental\323 initiatives have been institutional: the EU has ma\ de a)Tj 0.0284 Tc -0.0119 Tw T*(concerted effort to help MERCOSUR to strengthen its own intraregional)Tj 0.03371 Tc 0.06081 Tw T*(governance capacity, hoping to help these South American nations to)Tj 0.02229 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(help themselves. )Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.0139 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (The EU\325s trade treatment of MERCOSUR within the EMIFCA framework)Tj 0.0038 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (has re\337ected the pure interregional aspect of the process. Speci\336c\ ally, the)Tj 0.049 Tw T*(EU has refused to deal individually with Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and\ )Tj -0.0032 Tw T*(Paraguay, explicitly stating that it will only deal with them as a group\ \320 a)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 8 0 0 8 274.1225 663.1211 Tm (Vinod K. Aggarwal and Edward A. Fogarty)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 19.5239 0 Td (211)Tj ET 1 g /R14 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R17 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (10EUTS-CH08\(207-240\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 211)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R14 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 148 0 obj 6357 endobj 149 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 150 0 obj << /Length 151 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R14 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R12 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.0477 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 127.181 638.3862 Tm (stance that has given a considerable \336llip to MERCOSUR nations\325 ef\ forts )Tj 0.39461 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(to improve their collective coherence for the sake of negotiations.)Tj 0.04269 Tw T*(Corresponding to this one-to-one approach, the EU has proposed highly)Tj 0.1048 Tw T*(uniform terms for all MERCOSUR nations within the boundaries of the)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(proposed agreement.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1727 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Faust argues that the overall quality of the EMIFCA process \320 if not \ )Tj 0.092 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (the speci\336c strength, nature, or trade treatment of the emerging regi\ me)Tj 0.0054 Tc -0.00549 Tw T*(therein \320 can best be explained by a variety of factors. He \336nds t\ he primary)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0426 Tw T*(causes of the relatively slow pace of development of the EU\320MERCOSUR)Tj 0.0145 Tc -0.0146 Tw T*(regime in the dynamics among European interest groups and institutions.)Tj 0.00661 Tc -0.0067 Tw T*(The familiar split among globally competitive business groups \(particul\ arly)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.009 Tw T*(in service sectors\), which are keen on gaining access to MERCOSUR \320 \ and)Tj 0.06779 Tw T*(especially Brazilian \320 markets, and relatively uncompetitive or prote\ cted)Tj 0.0719 Tw T*(sectors such as textiles and \(mainly\) agriculture, which are loath to \ face)Tj 0.0844 Tw T*(direct competition from their South American counterparts, has yielded)Tj 0.0096 Tw T*(something of a stalemate among these interest groups. While the EU and)Tj 0.00571 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(MERCOSUR did establish a business forum in an attempt to encourage par-)Tj 0.0154 Tc -0.0155 Tw T*(ticipation of free-trade oriented groups, this forum has had only a mode\ st)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.08211 Tw T*(impact on the course of negotiations. There has been a similar, familiar\ )Tj 0.01649 Tc -0.0166 Tw T*(split between the relatively gung-ho, liberalizing Commission and a more\ )Tj 0.00929 Tc -0.0094 Tw T*(skeptical Council \(where protectionist interests have somewhat more swa\ y)Tj 0.01421 Tc -0.0143 Tw T*(through national governments\), with the Council dragging its feet in pr\ o-)Tj T*(viding the Commission with the necessary approval to begin negotiations)Tj 0.0168 Tc -0.01691 Tw T*(\(in 1999, almost four years after EMIFCA was established\) and continui\ ng)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(to keep the Commission on a short leash thereafter. )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.27251 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (While both the interest group and institutional stalemates help to)Tj 0.0365 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (explain the slow progress toward an interregional agreement, Faust \336n\ ds)Tj 0.1241 Tw T*(the international environment to be the primary reason why there has)Tj 0.03371 Tw T*(been any progress at all. Within the EU\320MERCOSUR context, Faust \336n\ ds)Tj 0.0137 Tc -0.01379 Tw T*(the EU\325s global systemic interests and its more political-institution\ al goals)Tj 0.00391 Tc -0.004 Tw T*(to be in line. The EU\325s general interest in a deal with the countries\ of South)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.01401 Tw T*(America can largely be understood in terms of the EU\325s need generally\ to)Tj 0.1291 Tw T*(balance against U.S. global economic in\337uence and speci\336cally to k\ eep)Tj 0.01131 Tc -0.0114 Tw T*(itself from being shut out of the high-potential Latin American economie\ s)Tj 0.0135 Tc -0.0136 Tw T*(by U.S. regional overtures \320 \336rst with NAFTA and now perhaps with \ a Free)Tj 0.0121 Tc -0.01221 Tw T*(Trade Area of the Americas \(FTAA\). Moreover, with respect to nesting c\ on-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0007 Tw T*(siderations, the strength of the regime, particularly provisions on disp\ ute)Tj 0.0033 Tc -0.0034 Tw T*(settlement, is driven by the EU\325s interest in tying the creation of a\ n interre-)Tj 0.006 Tc -0.0061 Tw T*(gional regime to the successful completion of the Doha Round of the WTO)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0314 Tw T*(\(where similar rules would presumably then be in force on a multilatera\ l)Tj 0.0056 Tc 0 Tw T*(basis\). )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.21249 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Existing WTO rules, for their part, have shaped the proposed FTA\325s)Tj -0.0011 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (product coverage by pushing both sides to agree to a particular array th\ at)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(reaches the required 90 percent level of coverage.)Tj 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8 0 0 8 127.181 663.1211 Tm (212)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 2.6057 0 Td (EU Trade Strategies)Tj ET 1 g /R14 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R12 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (10EUTS-CH08\(207-240\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 212)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R14 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 151 0 obj 6708 endobj 152 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 153 0 obj << /Length 154 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R14 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R20 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.00929 Tc -0.0094 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 135.1811 638.3862 Tm (Although EU concerns about both its position in the international polit-\ )Tj 0.0067 Tc -0.00681 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (ical economy and the competitive position of European \336rms may accoun\ t)Tj 0.0013 Tc -0.0014 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(for the existence of European initiatives toward South America, they do \ not)Tj 0.0038 Tc -0.00391 Tw T*(necessarily explain the nature of these initiatives. And with respect to\ com-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0386 Tw T*(mercial treatment, as noted above, the EU has made explicit its desire t\ o)Tj 0.3222 Tw T*(foster the consolidation of the MERCOSUR bloc, pursuing an Inter-)Tj -0.01151 Tw T*(Institutional Agreement with MERCOSUR to coordinate bloc-to-bloc rela-)Tj 0.1102 Tw T*(tions before any discussions of commercial agreements or liberalization)Tj 0.0016 Tw T*(began. Whether this European approach has been speci\336cally to promote\ )Tj 0.0168 Tc -0.017 Tw T*(its own form of political-economic regional organization as a model to b\ e)Tj 0.0101 Tc -0.01019 Tw T*(copied \336rst by MERCOSUR and perhaps later by others is not yet clear,\ but)Tj 0.0123 Tc -0.01241 Tw T*(it is at least suggestive that this encouragement of a counterpart\325s \ regional)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0273 Tw T*(organization may indeed be among Europe\325s primary motivations in any)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(interregional context.)Tj /F4 1 Tf 0.0058 Tc -0.00591 Tw 2.2222 TL T*(EU\320East Asia)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.01221 Tc -0.0123 Tw 1.6111 TL T*(As Julie Gilson suggests in her chapter, the EU relationship with the co\ un-)Tj 0.01511 Tc -0.0152 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(tries of East Asia within the Asia\320Europe Meeting \(ASEM\) is an exam\ ple of)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.2271 Tw T*(hybrid interregionalism that has shown occasional signs of becoming)Tj 0.0065 Tc -0.00661 Tw T*(\322purer.\323 As Gilson attests, Asia\320Europe ties represent a strate\ gically import-)Tj 0.00771 Tc -0.0078 Tw T*(ant part of the international political economy as the third, relatively\ atro-)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.0032 Tw T*(phied leg of the \322wobbly triangle\323 \(compared to the more robust U\ .S.\320EU)Tj 0.0903 Tw T*(and U.S.\320East Asia legs\). While the EU and the ASEAN Plus Three \(AP\ T\))Tj 0.1953 Tw T*(group have outlined a fairly comprehensive set of issues on which to)Tj 0.01871 Tw T*(pursue cooperation, this seems to be the only truly ambitious element of\ )Tj -0.0097 Tw T*(this regime. While there are a number of working groups and committees)Tj 0.00031 Tc -0.0004 Tw T*(associated with ASEM over the range of its relevant issue areas, these g\ roups)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1805 Tw T*(are staffed at a relatively low level and, more generally, ASEM lacks a)Tj -0.0143 Tw T*(permanent secretariat and the policy guidelines associated with ASEM are\ )Tj 0.2395 Tw T*(nonbinding \320 in Gilson\325s words, they have not comprised signi\336c\ ant)Tj 0.0332 Tw T*(\322deliverables\323 for the EU \(or the APT\). Thus ASEM is quite weak,\ both in)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(terms of its institutionalization and its rule bindingness. )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.28191 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (The regime nature is relatively comprehensive-developmentalist. As)Tj 0.0022 Tc -0.0023 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (noted above, ASEM has a broad issue scope; and, while explicitly a relat\ ion-)Tj 0.0027 Tc -0.00279 Tw T*(ship among equals, ASEM emphasizes aiding Asian development, especially)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.01331 Tw T*(the facilitation of European investment in East Asian countries. However\ ,)Tj 0.00079 Tw T*(this developmental emphasis is not even across or even within countries:\ )Tj 0.04449 Tw T*(the Europeans emphasize aid and investment in different proportions in)Tj 0.00529 Tc -0.0054 Tw T*(different countries, and are more skeptical regarding trade preferences \ with)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(some poor countries \(notably China\) than others. )Tj -0.0056 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (ASEM is similarly mixed in terms of the EU\325s commercial treatment of \ its)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0517 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (East Asian counterpart: there are elements of both pure interregionalism\ )Tj 0.00819 Tc -0.0083 Tw T*(\(EU\320ASEAN\) and bilateralism \(EU and non-ASEAN countries\), and the\ EU\325s)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(uniformity of treatment of East Asian countries varies across issue area\ s.)Tj /F3 1 Tf 8 0 0 8 274.1225 663.1211 Tm (Vinod K. Aggarwal and Edward A. Fogarty)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 19.5239 0 Td (213)Tj ET 1 g /R14 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R20 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (10EUTS-CH08\(207-240\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 213)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R14 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 154 0 obj 6714 endobj 155 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 156 0 obj << /Length 157 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R14 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R6 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.00349 Tc -0.0036 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 136.181 638.3862 Tm (Gilson attributes the modest evolution of EU\320East Asian interregional\ ism)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0934 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (to the diversity of factors shaping its direction. She \336nds interest-\ group)Tj 0.0036 Tc -0.00369 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(activity to be a compelling explanation for the initiation and early pro\ gress)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.013 Tw T*(of ASEM, with the input of business groups essential to the establishmen\ t)Tj 0.08411 Tw T*(of institutionalized mechanisms such as the AEPF to promote trade and)Tj 0.1338 Tw T*(investment ties. Alternatively, these groups\325 \(and particularly Euro\ pean)Tj -0.00951 Tw T*(businesses\325\) disappointment with the lack of progress on these front\ s and)Tj 0.16589 Tw T*(subsequent disengagement from the ASEM process has been central to)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(ASEM\325s deceleration. )Tj 0.0004 Tc 0.11391 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Interestingly, she \336nds that there was a lack of bureaucratic content\ ion)Tj -0.0009 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (regarding ASEM, largely because member governments did not seem to take)Tj 0.33501 Tw T*(the process suf\336ciently seriously to warrant any real challenge to th\ e)Tj -0.0161 Tw T*(Commission\325s central facilitating role in the Council. This suggests \ not only)Tj -0.0153 Tc -0.0015 Tw T*(that Commission interest in task-expansion in general did not lead to a \ strong)Tj 0.0004 Tc 0.1122 Tw T*(push toward a strong regime with East Asia more speci\336cally, but that\ an)Tj -0.0103 Tc -0.0065 Tw T*(absence of bureaucratic contention simply re\337ected the lack of salien\ ce of the)Tj -0.011 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(issue of interregionalism with East Asia within the EU more generally. )Tj 0.0015 Tc -0.0074 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Gilson suggests further that international systemic concerns surely serv\ ed)Tj 0.01131 Tc -0.0172 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (as an underlying rationale for ASEM, both for the Europeans \320 who sou\ ght)Tj 0.00681 Tc -0.0127 Tw T*(to counter the U.S.-led APEC \320 and more generally to solidify the thi\ rd side)Tj 0.01131 Tc -0.01241 Tw T*(of the EU\320U.S.\320East Asian triangle. However, while it is likely th\ at EU con-)Tj 0.0023 Tc -0.00819 Tw T*(cerns about speci\336c emerging East Asian powers such as China led it t\ o seek)Tj -0.0006 Tc -0.00529 Tw T*(to treat China differently from other developing East Asian nations in t\ erms)Tj 0.0033 Tc -0.0092 Tw T*(of trade, the generally dominant position of the EU in this process \320\ more a)Tj -0.0047 Tc -0.00121 Tw T*(function of its political coherence than its total economic capacity \320\ was not)Tj 0.0042 Tc -0.0101 Tw T*(suf\336cient to establish a strong regime on European terms. Nesting con\ cerns)Tj 0.0106 Tc -0.01649 Tw T*(seem to be muted, as ASEM was initiated with post-1995 WTO consistency)Tj -0.00571 Tc -0.0002 Tw T*(in mind \320 and because little progress has been made on trade provisio\ ns that)Tj -0.00011 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(might actually raise the specter of consistency with global rules.)Tj -0.0117 Tc -0.0051 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Finally, ASEM can to some extent be understood, particularly in terms of\ its)Tj -0.0074 Tc -0.0094 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (nature, as being shaped by the European Union to replicate its own organ\ iza-)Tj -0.0163 Tc -0.0005 Tw T*(tional form, adopting a broad political, economic, and social agenda sim\ ilar to)Tj 0.0004 Tc 0.06419 Tw T*(that of the EU within a Eurasian context. However, it is not clear that \ this)Tj -0.00951 Tc -0.00729 Tw T*(encouragement of regionalist mimicry was a primary motivation of Europea\ n)Tj -0.01401 Tc -0.00279 Tw T*(policymakers \(whether for integrationist goals with East Asia or within\ Europe)Tj 0.0005 Tc 0.0172 Tw T*(itself\), despite the fact that, as Gilson suggests, the promotion of AS\ EM and)Tj 0.0004 Tc -0.0018 Tw T*(\322ASEM Asia\323 is a helpful element in the development of the Europea\ n iden-)Tj 0.04401 Tw T*(tity. It is thus unclear whether the weakness of ASEM is related to a la\ ck of)Tj 0.0043 Tw T*(commitment on the part of high-ranking European of\336cials to associate\ the)Tj -0.011 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(development of ASEM with that of Europe itself. )Tj /F4 1 Tf 0.0058 Tc -0.006 Tw 2.2222 TL T*(EU\320Southern Mediterranean)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.0161 Tc -0.0162 Tw 1.6111 TL T*(The EuroMed Partnership \(EMP\), originally set up by the European Union\ )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.23911 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(to encourage political, economic, and social stability of the southern)Tj 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8 0 0 8 127.181 663.1211 Tm (214)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 2.6057 0 Td (EU Trade Strategies)Tj ET 1 g /R14 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R6 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (10EUTS-CH08\(207-240\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 214)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R14 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 157 0 obj 6889 endobj 158 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 159 0 obj << /Length 160 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R14 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R15 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.086 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 126.1811 638.3862 Tm (littoral states of the Mediterranean, has, according to Beverly Crawford\ ,)Tj 0.01601 Tc -0.0161 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(fallen far short of the hopes of both sides at its creation in 1995. The\ EMP)Tj 0.0116 Tc -0.0117 Tw T*(is perhaps the weakest of the interregional regimes among these cases: n\ ot)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.2088 Tw T*(only are EMP guidelines completely nonbinding, but it also lacks the)Tj 0.0703 Tw T*(formal bodies such as a secretariat, parliamentary assembly, and dispute\ )Tj 0.0623 Tw T*(settlement mechanisms that give some other such regimes some institu-)Tj 0.0047 Tw T*(tional personality. Indeed, the Commission acts as the only coordinating\ )Tj 0.1915 Tw T*(institution, as the highly fractious grouping of Mediterranean non-EU)Tj 0.1199 Tw T*(member countries \(MNMCs\) lacks any sort of counterpart coordination)Tj 0.0056 Tc 0 Tw T*(institution. )Tj 0.0033 Tc -0.0034 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (With respect to its nature, rather more like other comparable EU arrange\ -)Tj 0.00011 Tc -0.0002 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (ments, the EMP has both a comprehensive issue scope and a strongly devel\ -)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0799 Tw T*(opmental tilt. While the EU has committed to creating a free trade area)Tj 0.0955 Tw T*(around the Mediterranean by 2010, its goals in this and other included)Tj 0.0768 Tw T*(issues are primarily political: Europeans hope greater economic freedom)Tj -0.01691 Tw T*(can generate pressure for greater political freedoms in Middle Eastern a\ nd)Tj 0.1058 Tw T*(North African countries, while balancing a clear pro-democratic agenda)Tj 0.1322 Tw T*(with a push for mutual respect both between Europe and these mostly)Tj 0.0488 Tw T*(Muslim countries and among the southern littoral countries themselves.)Tj -0.0141 Tw T*(The EU has also offered signi\336cant amounts of aid to these countries \ on a)Tj 0.00549 Tc -0.0056 Tw T*(bilateral basis, in part to help them prepare and adjust to the promised\ free)Tj -0.00571 Tw T*(trade area. )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0977 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (The EU\325s commercial treatment of the MNMCs has been mostly non-)Tj 0.06709 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (uniform in terms of treatment and bilateral in terms of trade types. The\ )Tj 0.00681 Tc -0.0069 Tw T*(uniformity of treatment that exists has been initiated not by the EU but\ by)Tj 0.0006 Tc -0.0007 Tw T*(those countries \(including soon-to-be members and hopefuls such as Malt\ a,)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.08051 Tw T*(Cyprus, and Turkey\) that have followed the Copenhagen criteria for EU)Tj 0.0161 Tc -0.0162 Tw T*(aspirants; for the rest, the terms of trade have been a function not onl\ y of)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0683 Tw T*(EU evaluation of their reforms but also the most relevant issues at stak\ e)Tj 0.20911 Tw T*(with any particular country \(e.g., migration, trade pro\336le in goods \ or)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(services, etc.\).)Tj -0.01289 Tc -0.00391 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Crawford \336nds that different likely explanations exist for different \ elements)Tj 0.0005 Tc -0.00571 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (of the EMP. She believes that balance of power concerns best help us und\ er-)Tj -0.006 Tc -0.0108 Tw T*(stand the genesis of the regime: the EU promoted the EMP to simultaneous\ ly)Tj -0.0034 Tc -0.0134 Tw T*(counter U.S. in\337uence in the region, shape trans-Mediterranean relati\ ons via)Tj 0.0004 Tc 0.05659 Tw T*(its dominant relational power, and contain political Islam. However, oth\ er)Tj 0.14371 Tw T*(explanations better explain why the EU chose an interregional regime to)Tj 0.02609 Tw T*(manage this relationship as well as the speci\336c elements of the regim\ e. The)Tj 0.1837 Tw T*(EU\325s self-image as a Kantian \322normative power\323 and subsequent p\ olicies)Tj -0.0016 Tc -0.0152 Tw T*(following that model, as well as the ambitions of the Commission to use \ the)Tj -0.0024 Tc -0.0144 Tw T*(EMP to expand its own policy remit, are the key factors shaping the comp\ re-)Tj -0.011 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(hensive and developmental nature of the regime. )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.3625 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (The regime\325s weakness and bilateral-leaning commercial treatment)Tj 0.01649 Tc -0.0166 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (prevail for other reasons. Interest groups\325 over-time decline in supp\ ort for)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 8 0 0 8 274.1225 663.1211 Tm (Vinod K. Aggarwal and Edward A. Fogarty)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 19.5239 0 Td (215)Tj ET 1 g /R14 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R15 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (10EUTS-CH08\(207-240\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 215)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R14 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 160 0 obj 6673 endobj 161 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 162 0 obj << /Length 163 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R14 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R8 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 0 Tr 8 0 0 8 127.181 663.1211 Tm (216)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 2.6057 0 Td (EU Trade Strategies)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.0154 Tc -0.0155 Tw 9 0 0 9 127.181 638.3862 Tm (and interest in the EuroMed framework \320 related to the lack of progre\ ss of)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0145 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(domestic economic liberalization in MNMCs \320 have been both cause and)Tj -0.0126 Tw T*(consequence of the gulf in European and MNMC attitudes toward strong,)Tj -0.0022 Tw T*(liberal-leaning rules and institutions. Meanwhile, the reality of the as\ ym-)Tj 0.01871 Tw T*(metric dependence in this relationship has undermined the EU\325s inclin\ a-)Tj 0.01601 Tc -0.0161 Tw T*(tion to pursue a liberal interregional arrangement in terms of two \322e\ qual\323)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0537 Tw T*(regions, which has hampered the creation of a strong, mutually binding)Tj 0.1431 Tw T*(regime in which the EU treats the MNMCs in a uniform, interregional)Tj 0.1169 Tw T*(manner. Moreover, the structural power of the United States inevitably)Tj 0.0717 Tw T*(shapes the context in which the EU pursues its own policies toward the)Tj 0.015 Tc -0.01511 Tw T*(MNMCs, with Washington\325s somewhat erratic involvement in the Middle)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(East in particular hindering the creation of a stable European approach.\ )Tj /F4 1 Tf 0.0058 Tc -0.00591 Tw 2.2222 TL T*(EU\320Africa, Caribbean, and the Paci\336c \(ACP\))Tj /F2 1 Tf -0.0016 Tc -0.0043 Tw 1.6111 TL T*(As John Ravenhill notes in his chapter, Europe\325s relationship with th\ e coun-)Tj 0.0045 Tc -0.01041 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(tries of Africa, the Caribbean, and the Paci\336c Islands represents its\ \336rst, and)Tj 0.0016 Tc -0.00751 Tw T*(perhaps most unwieldy, attempt at establishing an institutionalized inte\ rre-)Tj 0.01131 Tc 0.0183 Tw T*(gional relationship. Born in the wake of decolonization, Europe reconsti\ t-)Tj -0.0049 Tc -0.00101 Tw T*(uted its commercial relationships with these ex-colonies in the Yaound\216\ and)Tj -0.00459 Tc -0.0013 Tw T*(Lom\216 conventions, which managed to build a strong, developmental regi\ me)Tj 0.01131 Tc -0.0092 Tw T*(between Europe and these generally small, poor countries. The strength o\ f)Tj 0.00909 Tc -0.015 Tw T*(the Lom\216 regime derived primarily from its high degree of institution\ aliza-)Tj 0.01131 Tc 0.01241 Tw T*(tion, as it featured \336ve separate joint EU\320ACP institutions to man\ age rela-)Tj 0.343 Tw T*(tions on an interregional basis; yet while Lom\216 certainly featured a)Tj 0.0865 Tw T*(clearly-de\336ned set of rules for ACP access to European markets \(and \ vice)Tj 0.0002 Tc -0.0061 Tw T*(versa\), these rules were only moderately binding. That is, though Lom\216\ pro-)Tj 0.01131 Tc 0.10921 Tw T*(visions were \322contractual\323 in nature, the Europeans ignored them w\ hen)Tj -0.00011 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(they found it necessary to do so, particularly in Lom\216\325s waning ye\ ars. )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0621 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Lom\216 was both highly comprehensive and highly developmentalist in)Tj -0.0161 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (nature, covering a wide range of issues from trade, investment, and aid \ to)Tj 0.0144 Tc -0.0146 Tw T*(more socio-political matters such as social, cultural, and individual ri\ ghts.)Tj 0.00549 Tc -0.0056 Tw T*(The economic side of these arrangements was heavily preferential \320 de\ spite)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.18021 Tw T*(some inconsistencies with the multilateral trade regime \320 setting up \ a)Tj 0.1277 Tw T*(number of mechanisms through which ACP countries became Europe\325s)Tj 0.0659 Tw T*(\322preferred partners.\323 These provisions and institutions applied ge\ nerally)Tj 0.123 Tw T*(throughout the EU\320ACP relationship with a high degree of uniformity,)Tj 0.05321 Tw T*(though the Europeans did provide special treatment within Lom\216 to the\ )Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(poorest of the ACP countries. )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1743 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (The EU\325s commercial treatment of the ACP countries was somewhat)Tj 0.1189 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (more mixed in its interregional-bilateral basis: although there existed \ a)Tj 0.1003 Tw T*(uni\336ed secretariat to coordinate ACP positions and thus create a pure\ ly)Tj 0.01109 Tc -0.0112 Tw T*(interregional relationship, in fact individual European countries tended\ to)Tj 0.0027 Tc -0.00279 Tw T*(favor dealing more directly with their traditional clients, thus undermi\ ning)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(a true region-to-region track. )Tj ET 1 g /R14 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R8 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (10EUTS-CH08\(207-240\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 216)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R14 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 163 0 obj 6729 endobj 164 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 165 0 obj << /Length 166 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R14 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R41 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.02769 Tc -0.0112 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 135.1811 638.3862 Tm (Ravenhill suggests that explaining the evolution of the EU\320ACP inter-\ )Tj 0.0193 Tc -0.00279 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (regional relationship is complicated by the fact that different factors \ pre-)Tj 0.0249 Tc -0.00841 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(vailed at different times. He argues that systemic security consideratio\ ns)Tj 0.03371 Tc 0.02609 Tw T*(\320 and in particular matters of economic security for Europeans such a\ s)Tj 0.01331 Tw T*(the stability of the supply of raw materials \320 were a primary conside\ ra-)Tj 0.0313 Tc -0.0148 Tw T*(tion in the early development of the regime, and that the Lom\216 proces\ s)Tj 0.0199 Tc -0.0034 Tw T*(began to lose steam \320 and the regime began to weaken \320 as these se\ curity)Tj 0.03371 Tc 0.3064 Tw T*(concerns began to abate in the 1980s and 1990s. Meanwhile, the)Tj 0.1068 Tw T*(dif\336culty of maintaining a strong regime that was proving ever more)Tj 0.0576 Tw T*(dif\336cult to nest within the WTO \320 and with a set of partners that \ was)Tj 0.02631 Tc -0.0098 Tw T*(decreasingly important in Europe\325s international commercial relations\ \320)Tj 0.0181 Tc -0.0016 Tw T*(ultimately undermined the Lom\216 regime and led the EU to align its tra\ de)Tj 0.03371 Tc -0.0072 Tw T*(treatment of the ACP more closely with those types allowed within the)Tj 0.0222 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(WTO\325s Article 24.)Tj 0.0143 Tc -0.0144 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Economic interests were very important in shaping both the nature and)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.09579 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (the strength of the Lom\216 regime. The terms of Lom\216\325s preferenti\ al \(i.e.,)Tj 0.00169 Tc -0.0018 Tw T*(developmental\) access to European markets was de\336ned in large part b\ y the)Tj 0.00999 Tc -0.0101 Tw T*(interests that did not accept an arrangement not tilted in their favor, \ most)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1447 Tw T*(notably European farmers, or by those that bene\336ted from preferential\ )Tj 0.1721 Tw T*(access, notably European banana and sugar traders. This latter group\325\ s)Tj 0.0289 Tw T*(concern in the late 1990s that its global interests could be hurt by mai\ n-)Tj 0.0157 Tc -0.01579 Tw T*(taining the Lom\216 arrangements in the face of WTO condemnation caused)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0816 Tw T*(their ardor for Lom\216 to cool, and provided perhaps the \336nal nail i\ n the)Tj 0.0957 Tw T*(cof\336n of the existing regime. Meanwhile, whereas NGO activists\325 in\ itial)Tj 0.1714 Tw T*(support for Lom\216\325s developmental provisions provided a much-needed\ )Tj 0.0097 Tc -0.0099 Tw T*(\336llip to the regime, their later quali\336cation of support added ano\ ther blow)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(from societal interests to the tottering regime.)Tj -0.017 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Bureaucratic politics in this case were largely an internal affair withi\ n the)Tj 0.08299 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (Commission. The Development Directorate in the Commission had as its)Tj 0.09331 Tw T*(main responsibility maintaining the relationship with the ACP countries,\ )Tj 0.0403 Tw T*(and as a result defended this regime ferociously against other encroachi\ ng)Tj 0.2968 Tw T*(directorates \(e.g., the External Relations and Agricultural Directorate\ s\).)Tj -0.0054 Tc -0.0062 Tw T*(However, as disillusionment with Lom\216 within the Development Director\ ate)Tj -0.0016 Tc -0.00999 Tw T*(grew, and as the more global Trade Directorate\325s purview expanded wit\ h the)Tj 0.0056 Tc 0.0428 Tw T*(negotiation and completion of the Uruguay Round of GATT as well as the)Tj 0.12019 Tw T*(growing solidi\336cation of a single European trade policy, the bureaucr\ atic)Tj -0.00591 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(impetus supporting Lom\216 evaporated. )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.01089 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Ravenhill suggests that notions of regional identity played little role \ in)Tj 0.08569 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (promoting a \322European\323 approach to ACP countries, though there wer\ e)Tj 0.0041 Tc -0.0042 Tw T*(national/postcolonial identities that initially shaped the French and Br\ itish)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.011 Tw T*(approach to their former colonies in the Lom\216 process. While the prev\ al-)Tj 0.01151 Tc -0.0116 Tw T*(ence of the NIEO in the international discourse certainly did play a rol\ e in)Tj 0.0071 Tc -0.0072 Tw T*(de\336ning the nature and perhaps the strength of the Lom\216 regime, th\ is idea)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0538 Tw T*(was more a function of a Third World identity \(and thus ACP countries\325\ )Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 8 0 0 8 274.1225 663.1211 Tm (Vinod K. Aggarwal and Edward A. Fogarty)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 19.5239 0 Td (217)Tj ET 1 g /R14 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R41 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (10EUTS-CH08\(207-240\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 217)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R14 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 166 0 obj 6868 endobj 167 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 168 0 obj << /Length 169 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R14 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R37 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.12379 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 127.181 638.3862 Tm (approach to Lom\216\) than a European one, and over time seems to have)Tj 0.0139 Tc -0.01401 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(done little to strengthen a sense of regionalism in either Europe or amo\ ng)Tj 0.0078 Tc -0.0079 Tw T*(subgroupings of ACP countries. Overall, then, each of these factors seem\ ed)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0192 Tw T*(to work in concert, \336rst to promote the Lom\216 process and later to \ under-)Tj 0.1422 Tw T*(mine it, largely driven by the decreasing economic importance of ACP)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(countries and the loosening of post-colonial bonds.)Tj /F4 1 Tf 0.0058 Tc -0.006 Tw 2.2222 TL T*(EU\320Eastern Europe)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.0139 Tw 1.6111 TL T*(One of the more distinctive cases of EU interregionalism is the post-Col\ d)Tj 0.1226 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(War Western European engagement of the postcommunist countries of)Tj 0.064 Tw T*(Central and Eastern Europe. As C\216dric Dupont and Hilde Engelen show,)Tj 0.0107 Tc -0.0108 Tw T*(this overall case is in fact three separate sub-cases: the EU has pursue\ d sep-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.2701 Tw T*(arate engagement strategies each with the Visegrad group in Central)Tj 0.11189 Tw T*(Europe, the Baltic states, and the former republics of the Soviet Union.\ )Tj 0.0097 Tc -0.0098 Tw T*(Moreover, in each case these \322transient subregions\323 engaged the EU\ not as)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0078 Tw T*(permanent entities in themselves, but rather, at least in the \336rst tw\ o sub-)Tj 0.01041 Tw T*(cases, as temporary groupings searching for the best route to formal int\ e-)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(gration into the European Union.)Tj 0.0153 Tc -0.0154 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (The Central European countries \320 Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia\ ,)Tj 0.01401 Tc -0.0141 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (and Hungary \(and Slovenia\) \320 initially sought to enhance their chan\ ces of)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.17039 Tw T*(early accession into the EU through the creation of integration mech-)Tj 0.0069 Tc -0.007 Tw T*(anisms of their own, the Visegrad group and the Central Europe Free Trad\ e)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1171 Tw T*(Area \(CEFTA\). However, these nations\325 attempt to promote a region-t\ o-)Tj 0.04449 Tw T*(region approach gave way to an EU-directed bilateral approach based on)Tj 0.00929 Tc -0.0094 Tw T*(Europe Agreements \(EAs\) \320 a highly-institutionalized, broad-scoped,\ devel-)Tj 0.0081 Tc -0.00819 Tw T*(opmental set of agreements that set out the terms of EU assistance to th\ ese)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0018 Tw T*(countries and the necessary reforms they needed to undertake to gain EU)Tj 0.01601 Tc -0.0161 Tw T*(membership. Dupont and Engelen attribute this general shift from incipi-\ )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0199 Tw T*(ent interregionalism toward bilateralism primarily to interest group pre\ s-)Tj 0.00841 Tc -0.0085 Tw T*(sure among those producers concerned about competition from lower-cost)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(competitors to the east and EU concerns about allaying Russian fears abo\ ut)Tj 0.0107 Tc -0.0108 Tw T*(a wholesale Western takeover of its former client states, as well as the\ only)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0573 Tw T*(moderate success of Central European countries in promoting their own)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(interim collective integration.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1617 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (EU relations with the Baltic states followed a similar trajectory from)Tj 0.13589 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (initial interregionalism to bilateralism. Like the Central Europeans, th\ e)Tj 0.0058 Tc -0.00591 Tw T*(Baltic states generated their own progress toward sub-regional cooperati\ on,)Tj 0.0063 Tc -0.00639 Tw T*(a process that was supported by the EU. By the mid to late 1990s, howeve\ r,)Tj 0.0125 Tc -0.0126 Tw T*(both sides moved toward a preference for a bilateral approach, and the E\ U)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0528 Tw T*(ended up signing EAs with each of the three along similar lines as those\ )Tj 0.0537 Tw T*(with the Central European countries. With this set of countries, Dupont)Tj 0.007 Tw T*(and Engelen argue, international security concerns were even more dom-)Tj 0.0303 Tw T*(inant, given that the Baltic states were formerly part of the Soviet Uni\ on)Tj 0.1548 Tw T*(proper and still were home to large ethnic Russian minorities, and EU)Tj 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8 0 0 8 127.181 663.1211 Tm (218)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 2.6057 0 Td (EU Trade Strategies)Tj ET 1 g /R14 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R37 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (10EUTS-CH08\(207-240\) 19/12/03 4:48 PM Page 218)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R14 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 169 0 obj 6650 endobj 170 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 171 0 obj << /Length 172 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R14 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R2 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.0058 Tc -0.00591 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 126.1811 638.3862 Tm (leaders sought to avoid a negative Russian reaction to the Baltics\325 i\ nclusion)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(in Western security organizations.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.00169 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (In each of these two sub-cases, while Dupont and Engelen identify par-)Tj 0.00211 Tc -0.0022 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (ticular factors that helped shape the overall transition from interregio\ nal to)Tj 0.0103 Tc -0.01041 Tw T*(bilateral thinking, the strength, nature, and counterpart treatment in e\ ach)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.045 Tw T*(of the relevant countries were ultimately shaped by the EU blueprint for\ )Tj 0.0005 Tc -0.0006 Tw T*(prospective members. In this sense, these two groups of countries are di\ ffer-)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.0051 Tw T*(ent from all other cases and sub-cases because they consisted of countri\ es)Tj 0.1291 Tw T*(that were destined to become EU members, and thus were subject to a)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(dominant in\337uence that was clearly lacking elsewhere.)Tj 0.0163 Tc -0.0164 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (With the more formally organized group of former Soviet republics, the)Tj 0.00169 Tc -0.0018 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (Commonwealth of Independent States \(CIS\) \320 countries whose futures \ were)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1107 Tw T*(less directed toward gaining EU membership \320 the Union maintained a)Tj 0.01691 Tc -0.017 Tw T*(stronger tendency toward interregionalism. The EU set up an evolving set\ )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.01019 Tw T*(of arrangements with the CIS, \336rst involving technical assistance and\ aid)Tj 0.0085 Tc -0.0087 Tw T*(and later evolving into broader cooperation that institutionalized dialo\ gue)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.035 Tw T*(on a wide range of economic, social, and political issues. However, thes\ e)Tj 0.1998 Tw T*(arrangements have been conducted largely on a bilateral basis, as the)Tj 0.0052 Tc -0.00529 Tw T*(unclear status of the CIS remains a barrier \(among others\) to a more f\ ormal)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(interregional relationship.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0029 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Dupont and Engelen are chary of assigning explanations to the speci\336c\ )Tj 0.01089 Tc -0.011 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (elements of an interregional process between the EU and the CIS that may\ )Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.00211 Tw T*(only be in its very beginning stages. However, it seems clear that inter\ na-)Tj 0.08231 Tw T*(tional security concerns \(how to institutionalize relations with a form\ er)Tj 0.0701 Tw T*(superpower adversary\) and identity concerns \(who belongs in \322Europe\ \323\))Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(may be particularly relevant to this process as it evolves.)Tj /F4 1 Tf 0.0058 Tc -0.00591 Tw 2.2222 TL T*(EU\320North America)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc -0.0155 Tw 1.6111 TL T*(The de\336ning feature of the EU\320North American relationship among th\ ese)Tj 0.01131 Tc -0.0114 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(cases is the absence of any interregional regime process between these t\ wo)Tj 0.00549 Tc -0.0056 Tw T*(pillars of the international economy. As Edward Fogarty suggests, howeve\ r,)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.0103 Tw T*(this fact is primarily a result of the success of the EU\325s economic r\ elations)Tj 0.1087 Tw T*(with the countries of North America: with commercial relations on the)Tj 0.054 Tw T*(whole unproblematic and well-managed through both multilateral trade)Tj 0.0092 Tc -0.0094 Tw T*(and economic institutions and mid- and low-level of\336cial cooperation \ and)Tj 0.0081 Tc -0.00819 Tw T*(consultation, there has been little obvious need for an overarching inte\ rre-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0 Tw T*(gional regime with NAFTA as a whole. The EU has pursued some bilateral)Tj 0.0011 Tc -0.00121 Tw T*(agreements each with the United States, Canada, and Mexico \320 the \336\ rst two)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0462 Tw T*(as the basis of broader international agreements \(particularly on secto\ ral)Tj 0.0063 Tc -0.00639 Tw T*(issues\), and with Mexico as a response to the diversionary effects of N\ AFTA)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0452 Tw T*(\320 but there has been little impetus from any side for pursuing a comp\ re-)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(hensive interregional track between Europe and North America.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0323 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (This negative case requires an explanation for the lack of support, par-\ )Tj -0.0144 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (ticularly in the EU but also in North America, for an interregional acco\ rd.)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 8 0 0 8 274.1225 663.1211 Tm (Vinod K. Aggarwal and Edward A. Fogarty)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 19.5239 0 Td (219)Tj ET 1 g /R14 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R2 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (10EUTS-CH08\(207-240\) 19/12/03 4:49 PM Page 219)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R14 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 172 0 obj 6798 endobj 173 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 174 0 obj << /Length 175 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R14 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R11 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.0359 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 127.181 638.3862 Tm (While none of the general hypotheses suggests that the necessary condi-)Tj 0.0253 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(tions are in place for an EU\320North America interregional regime, Foga\ rty)Tj 0.0107 Tc -0.0108 Tw T*(concludes that some explanations for the interregional gap are better th\ an)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0274 Tw T*(others. Speci\336cally, he \336nds the interest group approach wanting, \ as any)Tj 0.0025 Tc -0.00259 Tw T*(interregional regime would represent more a political-strategic than an \ eco-)Tj 0.01199 Tc -0.0121 Tw T*(nomic project \(particularly between the Europeans and the United States\ \),)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.01691 Tw T*(and thus narrowly-focused business groups would not be particularly rel-\ )Tj 0.20399 Tw T*(evant to explaining the presence or absence of such a broad political)Tj 0.0154 Tc -0.0155 Tw T*(project. That said, the in\337uence of interest groups has been quite re\ levant)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0639 Tw T*(throughout the period in ensuring that occasional political spats do not\ )Tj 0.0144 Tc -0.0145 Tw T*(upset the EU\325s bilateral commercial relations with each of the three \ North)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(American countries.)Tj 0.0083 Tc -0.00841 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (The Council\325s refusal to allow the Commission to pursue such a politi\ cal)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.2177 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (project may be a factor in the absence of a TAFTA. The Commission)Tj 0.10519 Tw T*(showed interest in pursuing a binding, well-institutionalized agreement)Tj 0.1091 Tw T*(with North America as a whole, with Canada as such an arrangement\325s)Tj 0.0679 Tw T*(most vocal North American supporter. However, the Council\325s demurral)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(never allowed the idea to get off the ground.)Tj 0.00999 Tc -0.0101 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (The nature of the relationship between the EU and the United States is a\ )Tj 0.0014 Tc -0.0015 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (major element de\336ning the organization and dynamics of the internatio\ nal)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.10271 Tw T*(economy. The EU, which acts as a unit much more in economic affairs)Tj 0.006 Tc -0.0061 Tw T*(than in the political-security realm, inevitably uses the United States \ as the)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.02969 Tw T*(meter of its competitive position in the international economy, and vice\ )Tj 0.00191 Tw T*(versa. As such, the overall relationship between these two \320 as well \ as the)Tj 0.00729 Tc -0.0074 Tw T*(strength, nature, and commercial treatment in a hypothetical transatlant\ ic)Tj 0.0101 Tc -0.01019 Tw T*(agreement \320 is inevitably tied to the \322geoeconomic\323 position of\ each )Tj /F3 1 Tf 0 Tw 32.8946 0 Td (vis-\210-)Tj 0.0052 Tc -32.8946 -1.2778 Td (vis)Tj /F2 1 Tf -0.00529 Tw 1.4866 0 Td (the rest of the world. The primary goals of each \320 and the focus of i\ nter-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.12759 Tw -1.4866 -1.2778 Td (national commercial policymaking energy \320 are in solidifying access t\ o)Tj 0.0127 Tc -0.0128 Tw T*(other important markets and ensuring they are not disadvantaged in their\ )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1218 Tw T*(access to these markets relative to the other. This \322structural econo\ mic)Tj 0.1277 Tw T*(power\323 competition is constrained by WTO rules \320 the same rules th\ at)Tj -0.00301 Tw T*(derive largely from transatlantic negotiation, and thus make the idea of\ a)Tj 0.01311 Tc -0.0132 Tw T*(separate transatlantic trade agreement redundant. As long as both transa\ t-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.12759 Tw T*(lantic commercial ties and the overall multilateral trade regime remain)Tj -0.0163 Tw T*(stable \320 two crucial conditions \320 each side views its remaining in\ terests in)Tj 0.0022 Tc -0.0023 Tw T*(terms of its position in emerging markets, and will not dwell on whether\ or)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0793 Tw T*(not there is some formal arrangement across the Atlantic. The EU\325s FT\ A)Tj 0.07899 Tw T*(with Mexico emerged largely for this reason: threatened by the \322NAFTA\ )Tj 0.02229 Tw T*(effect,\323 the EU had a strong incentive to pursue a relatively strong \ agree-)Tj 0.05119 Tw T*(ment with Mexico that had a distinctively different nature from the less\ )Tj 0.1331 Tw T*(comprehensive but still well-institutionalized relations with the United\ )Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(States and Canada.)Tj 0.0128 Tc -0.01289 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (This inclination against the formalization of transatlantic economic tie\ s)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0775 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (likely grows apace with the chorus of voices within Europe pressing the)Tj 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8 0 0 8 127.181 663.1211 Tm (220)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 2.6057 0 Td (EU Trade Strategies)Tj ET 1 g /R14 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R11 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (10EUTS-CH08\(207-240\) 19/12/03 4:49 PM Page 220)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R14 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 175 0 obj 6893 endobj 176 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 177 0 obj << /Length 178 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R14 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R19 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.1144 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 126.1811 638.3862 Tm (establishment of the EU\325s international identity in juxtaposition to \ the)Tj 0.1165 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(United States. Certain Europeans might be more than willing to see an)Tj 0.0007 Tc -0.00079 Tw T*(erosion of relations across the Atlantic if such a development were the \ price)Tj 0.0049 Tc -0.005 Tw T*(for greater European unity and the emergence of the EU as a credible cou\ n-)Tj 0.0031 Tc -0.0032 Tw T*(terweight to the United States in international politics. While it is no\ t at all)Tj 0.002 Tc -0.00211 Tw T*(clear that this is a viable method of achieving a palpable \322Europeann\ ess,\323 it)Tj 0.0087 Tc -0.0088 Tw T*(does suggest that, regardless of other considerations, a strong interreg\ ional)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.05901 Tw T*(regime between the EU and North America would be extremely unlikely)Tj 0.0024 Tc -0.0025 Tw T*(until the EU strengthened its political and institutional identity in co\ ntexts)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(absent the United States.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.07249 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Thus the fate of commercial relations between the EU and the United)Tj 0.08279 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (States \(and North America more generally\) may be largely a function of\ )Tj 0.2131 Tw T*(the combined economic-security and political-identity interests of the )Tj 0.0609 Tw T*(EU. Absent a major shock to the organization of the international polit-\ )Tj 0.0027 Tc -0.00279 Tw T*(ical economy and a sudden favorable resolution of Europe\325s perpetual \ iden-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.15179 Tw T*(tity crisis, little movement toward a transatlantic agreement should be)Tj 0.0056 Tc 0 Tw T*(expected.)Tj /F4 1 Tf 0.0058 Tc -0.00591 Tw 10 0 0 10 126.1811 428.8862 Tm [(3)-1197.3(Comparing interregional regime evolution)]TJ /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.07021 Tw 9 0 0 9 126.1811 408.3862 Tm [(Table 8.1)-374.4(lays out the evolution for each of the six cases of EU-centered)]TJ 0.2121 Tw T*(interregionalism on our three outcomes of interest \320 regime strength,\ )Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(regime nature, and EU commercial treatment of the counterpart. )Tj 0.0134 Tc -0.0135 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (This table provides a before-and-after picture of interregional evolutio\ n,)Tj 0.00369 Tc -0.0038 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (with the \322before\323 columns \(which appeared in our introduction\) r\ epresent-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0759 Tw T*(ing the \336rst instance of signi\336cant EU cross-regional initiatives,\ and the)Tj 0.07449 Tw T*(\322after\323 columns representing the current status of these elements \ of the)Tj 0.0058 Tc -0.00591 Tw T*(regime. The table presents a fairly complex picture, so we consider the \ evo-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0193 Tw T*(lution of each of the three regime elements in turn, before moving on to\ )Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(evaluate our contending hypotheses across these cases.)Tj /F4 1 Tf 0.0058 Tc -0.006 Tw 2.2222 TL T*(Regime strength)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.0123 Tw 1.6111 TL T*(Regime strength is a function of two factors: its institutionalization, \ \(i.e.,)Tj 0.0313 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(the presence/absence of permanent forums such as a secretariat, dispute-\ )Tj -0.0079 Tw T*(settlement mechanism, parliamentary assembly, working groups, and the)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(like\) and the scope of enforceable rules that constrain actors\325 beha\ vior. )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0527 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Some implications about rule bindingness and regime institutionaliza-)Tj 0.0011 Tc -0.00121 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (tion can be drawn from this cross-case, over-time comparison. First, int\ erre-)Tj 0.0016 Tc -0.00169 Tw T*(gional regimes\325 rule bindingness tends to be low, except in the very \ notable)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.00529 Tw T*(exception of the case of Eastern Europe \(i.e., countries that will acce\ de to)Tj 0.0274 Tw T*(the EU and be directly bound by its internal rules\). The EU has general\ ly)Tj 0.07809 Tw T*(been unwilling to commit itself to be bound by strong rules in its com-)Tj 0.01981 Tw T*(mercial relations with other regions, preferring to retain a high degree\ of)Tj 0.0096 Tw T*(\337exibility to operate against the spirit of the agreements when neces\ sary.)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 8 0 0 8 274.1225 663.1211 Tm (Vinod K. Aggarwal and Edward A. Fogarty)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 19.5239 0 Td (221)Tj ET 1 g /R14 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R19 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (10EUTS-CH08\(207-240\) 19/12/03 4:49 PM Page 221)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R14 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 178 0 obj 6578 endobj 179 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 180 0 obj << /Length 181 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R14 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R16 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 0 Tr 8 0 0 8 127.181 663.1211 Tm (222)Tj ET 0 0 0 1 K 0.75 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R14 gs 142.431 143.999 m 142.431 644.999 l S BT /R16 gs /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 0 8 -8 0 134.0599 144 Tm (Table 8.1)Tj /F2 1 Tf 5.3704 0 Td (EU interregional relationships \(evolution\) )Tj /F3 1 Tf -5.3704 -2.75 Td [(Relationship )-2445.6(Regime )-4937.9(Regime )-4604.6(Regime nature)-4629.4(Regime nature)-4962.7(EU commercial)-1770.9(EU commercial )]TJ ET 0.5 w /R14 gs 172.311 143.999 m 172.311 644.999 l S BT /R16 gs 0 8 -8 0 166.0599 144 Tm [(\(T = 1 year\))-3000.7(strength \(T = 1\))-1479.8(strength \(2003\))-1214.5(\(T = 1\))-7769.6(\(2003\))-8171(treatment \(T = 1\))-790.4(treatment \(2003\))]TJ /F2 1 Tf 1.6893 Tw 0 -2 Td [(EU\320Southern Medium-weak)-1660.2(Medium)-4037.7(Medium-narrow, )-900.6(Comprehensive, )-1473.2(Uniform, )-2026.7(Uniform, )]TJ -0.00571 Tw 0 -1.25 Td [(Cone \(1995\))-18670.8(quasi-developmental)-1001.3(quasi-)-8355.3(interregional)-2270.7(interregional)]TJ ET /R14 gs 206.311 143.999 m 206.311 644.999 l S BT /R16 gs 0 Tw 0 8 -8 0 202.0599 426.6666 Tm (developmental)Tj -0.00571 Tw -35.3333 -1.875 Td [(EU\320East Asia )-1906.1(Medium-weak)-1660.2(Medium-weak)-1326.9(Comprehensive,)-3121.8(Quasi-comprehensive, )-405.8(Nonuniform,)-2113.7(Nonuniform,)]TJ 0 -1.25 Td [(\(1996\))-21466.2(quasi-developmental)-1001.3(quasi-developmental)-1334.6(interregional + )-1117.3(interregional + )]TJ ET /R14 gs 241.311 143.999 m 241.311 644.999 l S BT /R16 gs 0 Tw 0 8 -8 0 237.0599 516 Tm [(bilaterals)-4109.5(bilaterals)]TJ 1.6893 Tw -46.5 -1.875 Td [(EU\320Southern Weak)-5700.2(Weak)-5366.8(Comprehensive,)-3121.8(Comprehensive)-3747.7(Nonuniform, )-131.8(Nonuniform,)]TJ 17.299 Tw 0 -1.25 Td [(Mediterranean developmental)-3812.8(developmental)-4146.2(bilaterals)-4109.5(bilaterals)]TJ ET /R14 gs 276.311 143.999 m 276.311 644.999 l S BT /R16 gs 0 Tw 0 8 -8 0 272.0599 144 Tm (\(1995\))Tj 3.9863 Tw 0 -1.875 Td [(EU\320ACP Medium-strong)-1049.9(Medium)-4037.7(Comprehensive,)-3121.8(Comprehensive,)-3455.1(Mostly )3992(uniform,)-658(Quasi-uniform,)]TJ -0.0058 Tw 0 -1.25 Td [(\(1975\))-21466.2(very developmental)-1510.6(developmental)-4146.2(interregional)-2270.7(subdivided)]TJ ET /R14 gs 311.311 143.999 m 311.311 644.999 l S BT /R16 gs 0 Tw 0 8 -8 0 307.0599 582.8571 Tm (interregional)Tj -54.8571 -1.875 Td (EU\320Eastern )Tj 0 -1.25 Td (Europe\(1990\))Tj /F3 1 Tf 1.1594 -1.25 Td (CEEC/Baltics)Tj /F2 1 Tf 3.16251 Tw 7.0072 0 Td [(Medium-strong)-1049.9(Strong)-4924.4(Comprehensive,)-3121.8(Comprehensive, Nonuniform,)-2113.7(Mostly )3168.2(uniform,)]TJ -0.0058 Tw 16.3333 -1.25 Td [(developmental)-3812.8(developmental)-4146.2(interregional + )-1117.3(bilaterals)]TJ 0 Tw 22 -1.25 Td (bilaterals)Tj /F3 1 Tf -45.3406 -1.875 Td (USSR/CIS)Tj /F2 1 Tf 6.7529 Tw 7.0072 0 Td [(Weak)-5700.2(Medium)-4037.7(Narrow, Comprehensive, )3590.4(Uniform)-4301.2(Nonuniform, )]TJ ET /R14 gs 391.311 143.999 m 391.311 644.999 l S BT /R16 gs 0 Tw 0 8 -8 0 387.0599 340 Tm [(developmental)-3812.8(developmental)-12503.3(bilaterals)]TJ -0.00571 Tw -24.5 -1.875 Td [(EU\320North )-3179.9(US/Canada: )-2505.5(US/C: medium)-1043.7(US/Canada: narrow, )-1068.6(US/Canada: narrow, )-1402(Nonuniform, )-1826.8(Nonuniform, )]TJ 0 -1.25 Td [(America \(1990\))-993.1(medium)-4388.1(Mexico: )-3969(nondevelopmental)-1887.9(nondevelopmental)-2221.2(bilaterals)-4109.5(bilaterals)]TJ 8.1667 -1.25 Td [(Mexico: weak)-1930(medium)-4054.8(Mexico: )-6802.3(Mexico: )]TJ 3.0853 Tw 16.3333 -1.25 Td (comprehensive, comprehensive, )Tj ET 0.75 w /R14 gs 449.431 143.999 m 449.431 644.999 l S BT /R16 gs 0 Tw 0 8 -8 0 442.0599 340 Tm [(developmental)-3812.8(developmental)]TJ ET 1 g /R14 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R16 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (10EUTS-CH08\(207-240\) 19/12/03 4:49 PM Page 222)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w /R14 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 181 0 obj 5922 endobj 182 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 183 0 obj << /Length 184 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R14 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R1 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.06261 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 126.1811 638.3862 Tm (Indeed, even in the Eastern Europe case the rules do not affect the EU \320\ )Tj 0.1035 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(whose members already abide by these rules \320 but only those countries\ )Tj 0.03729 Tw T*(seeking to join it. That said, however, there has been some increase ove\ r)Tj 0.00661 Tw T*(time in the reciprocal bindingness of rules connecting the EU with coun-\ )Tj 0.00459 Tc -0.0047 Tw T*(tries from Latin America \(both MERCOSUR and Mexico\) as progress toward\ )Tj 0.00771 Tc -0.0078 Tw T*(free trade agreements has emerged with these countries. In the other cas\ es,)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0975 Tw T*(rule bindingness remains at a low level \320 and in EU relations with AC\ P)Tj 0.12621 Tw T*(countries, has decreased. What this suggests is that there may be some)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(general condition that tends to keep rule bindingness low, but that spec\ i\336c)Tj T*(conditions may send its evolution in different directions in different c\ ases.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.16229 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Second, the EU\325s interregional regimes have tended to become more)Tj 0.0237 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (institutionalized over time \(again, with the exception of the relations\ hip)Tj 0.1209 Tw T*(with the ACP countries\). It is perhaps not surprising that regimes have\ )Tj 0.0024 Tw T*(become institutionalized rather than binding: it is far less costly to e\ stab-)Tj 0.00349 Tw T*(lish working committees, forums, and the like to discuss mutual interest\ s)Tj 0.0412 Tw T*(and concerns than it is to commit oneself to rules that impose real cost\ s)Tj 0.0029 Tc -0.0031 Tw T*(and circumscribe freedom of action. A dividing line regarding institutio\ nal-)Tj 0.0145 Tc -0.0146 Tw T*(ization involves the presence of two key institutions, a secretariat \320\ which)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.00591 Tw T*(provides a regime with an organizational identity and bureaucratic face \ \320)Tj 0.03729 Tw T*(and a dispute settlement mechanism \320 which generally exists in connec\ -)Tj -0.0106 Tw T*(tion with binding rules. These two types of institutions tend to exist o\ nly)Tj 0.0231 Tw T*(in \322serious\323 regimes \(e.g., Lom\216\) and are absent in less seri\ ous ones \(e.g.,)Tj 0.004 Tc -0.0041 Tw T*(ASEM\) \320 though as the experience of APEC shows, having a secretariat\ does)Tj 0.00751 Tc -0.0076 Tw T*(not a strong regime make. While secretariats and dispute settlement mech\ -)Tj 0.0085 Tc -0.00861 Tw T*(anisms are still far from universal across our cases, they have become m\ ore)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(prevalent, particularly in EU relations with Latin America. )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.117 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (However, secretariats and dispute settlement mechanisms are not the)Tj 0.1618 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (only indicators of signi\336cant institutionalization. The EU relationsh\ ips)Tj -0.0054 Tw T*(with the United States and Canada, for instance, are considerably instit\ u-)Tj 0.0092 Tw T*(tionalized \(and binding\) \320 not necessarily at the highest levels of\ govern-)Tj 0.11369 Tw T*(ment involvement, but rather through deep cooperation at middle and)Tj 0.2484 Tw T*(lower levels of their bureaucracies on matters like standards and law)Tj 0.27541 Tw T*(enforcement. This suggests that institutionalization as an element of)Tj 0.0125 Tc -0.0126 Tw T*(regime strength is relevant more for increasing of\336cial and private i\ nterre-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.09331 Tw T*(gional cooperation that starts from a low or moderate level, and less so\ )Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(when this type of cooperation already exists.)Tj /F4 1 Tf 0.0058 Tc -0.006 Tw 2.2222 TL T*(Regime nature)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.0023 Tc -0.0024 Tw 1.6111 TL T*(Regime nature as we have de\336ned it is a function of two factors: issu\ e scope)Tj 0.01041 Tc -0.0105 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(\(i.e., the degree of inclusion of trade, investment, and other socio-po\ litical)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.0135 Tw T*(issues within the terms of an agreement\) and development focus \(i.e., \ the)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(degree of prevalence of developmentalist provisions and language\). )Tj 0.0099 Tc -0.01691 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (The obvious commonality among the cases with regard to regime nature)Tj 0.01019 Tc 0.20081 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (is that, with the exception of EU relations with the United States and)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 8 0 0 8 274.1225 663.1211 Tm (Vinod K. Aggarwal and Edward A. Fogarty)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 19.5239 0 Td (223)Tj ET 1 g /R14 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R1 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (10EUTS-CH08\(207-240\) 19/12/03 4:49 PM Page 223)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R14 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 184 0 obj 6727 endobj 185 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 186 0 obj << /Length 187 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R14 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R90 gs /F2 1 Tf -0.00639 Tc -0.0006 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 127.181 638.3862 Tm (Canada, they tend toward a comprehensive issue scope and a developmental\ )Tj 0.00549 Tc -0.0125 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(emphasis. Similar to the relationship between rule bindingness and insti\ tu-)Tj 0.01019 Tc 0.03619 Tw T*(tionalization, having a broad issue scope seems to come \322cheaper\323 \ than a)Tj 0.12981 Tw T*(development emphasis. Indeed, a broad issue scope is perhaps the most)Tj 0.0809 Tw T*(universal element of EU interregional regimes: the EU is quite consisten\ t)Tj 0.0078 Tc -0.0148 Tw T*(across time and space in promoting democratic institutions, human rights\ ,)Tj 0.0024 Tc -0.0094 Tw T*(and a robust civil society alongside its commercial objectives in its re\ lations)Tj 0.01019 Tc 0.0455 Tw T*(with other regions. Even in its more narrowly de\336ned \322regimes\323 \ with the)Tj 0.0605 Tw T*(United States and Canada, the narrow issue scope in this speci\336c cont\ ext)Tj 0.0943 Tw T*(only applies because there are other, more specialized regimes managing)Tj -0.0013 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(political and security cooperation. Especially compared to the United St\ ates,)Tj 0.01019 Tc 0.1786 Tw T*(the EU has made a point of pursuing a broad range of issues in all its)Tj -0.0013 Tc 0 Tw T*(relationships.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.15491 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (The developmental aspect of interregional regimes has become more)Tj -0.0032 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (complicated over time for the EU. When it established Lom\216 in 1975, t\ he)Tj 0.004 Tc -0.0042 Tw T*(multilateral trade regime \(GATT\) was relatively pliant with regard to \ prefer-)Tj 0.0032 Tc -0.0033 Tw T*(ential treatment of a certain set of trade partners; after the establish\ ment of)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1787 Tw T*(the WTO, however, nesting has become somewhat more dif\336cult. The)Tj 0.01199 Tc -0.0121 Tw T*(devolution of Lom\216 is a case in point. As such, while the EU has not \ aban-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.04269 Tw T*(doned the idea of developmental provisions in its interregional relation\ -)Tj 0.0363 Tw T*(ships, they have had to take new forms. These provisions have varied by)Tj 0.077 Tw T*(case: for example, in ASEM they have focused on FDI, with MERCOSUR)Tj 0.45779 Tw T*(they have focused on institution-building, and with the Southern)Tj 0.0569 Tw T*(Mediterranean countries they have focused on aid. Meanwhile, develop-)Tj 0.0136 Tc -0.0137 Tw T*(mental provisions in relations with countries of Eastern Europe have bee\ n)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.27161 Tw T*(somewhat less problematic, as these countries are in line to become)Tj 0.118 Tw T*(members of the EU \(a regional grouping whose internal developmental)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(provisions generally fall outside the scope of WTO rules\).)Tj /F4 1 Tf 0.0058 Tc -0.006 Tw 2.2222 TL T*(EU commercial treatment of the counterpart)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.0023 Tc -0.0024 Tw 1.6111 TL T*(EU commercial treatment of counterpart involves two factors: the degree \ of)Tj 0.0143 Tc -0.0144 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(uniformity of EU treatment of speci\336c countries in the counterpart re\ gion)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0038 Tw T*(\(i.e., one set of terms for all countries in the counterpart region wou\ ld be)Tj 0.00101 Tw T*(perfectly uniform, while a separate set of terms for all countries would\ be)Tj 0.0125 Tc -0.0126 Tw T*(perfectly nonuniform\) and the EU\325s negotiations/agreement type with \ the)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0722 Tw T*(counterpart \(i.e., whether the EU pursues region-to region \(pure inter\ re-)Tj 0.00481 Tc -0.005 Tw T*(gional\) approach, a region-to-country approach \(bilateral\), or someth\ ing in)Tj 0.0056 Tc 0 Tw T*(between\).)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.0168 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (In EU commercial treatment of counterpart regions, with the exception)Tj -0.01579 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (of Eastern Europe \(where the shifting requirements of EU accession dete\ r-)Tj 0.0567 Tw T*(mine commercial treatment type\), there seems to be a certain logic con-\ )Tj 0.15109 Tw T*(necting interregionalism and uniformity of treatment, bilateralism and)Tj 0.0854 Tw T*(nonuniformity of treatment, and a mixed approach to each \320 though it)Tj 0.14909 Tw T*(may be that the prevailing logic depends on the pairing. For instance,)Tj 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8 0 0 8 127.181 663.1211 Tm (224)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 2.6057 0 Td (EU Trade Strategies)Tj ET 1 g /R14 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R90 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (10EUTS-CH08\(207-240\) 19/12/03 4:49 PM Page 224)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R14 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 187 0 obj 6576 endobj 188 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 189 0 obj << /Length 190 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R14 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R99 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.045 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 126.1811 638.3862 Tm (while uniformity/interregionalism may derive from an EU inclination to)Tj 0.1398 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(reduce bargaining costs \(e.g., EU\320ACP\) or promote regional integrat\ ion)Tj 0.1935 Tw T*(elsewhere \(e.g., EU\320MERCOSUR\), bilateralism/nonuniformity may be a)Tj 0.2162 Tw T*(result of an EU desire to increase bargaining leverage \(e.g., EU\320Nor\ th)Tj 0.1389 Tw T*(America\) or an inability to coax any coherence within the counterpart)Tj 0.11369 Tw T*(region \(e.g., EU\320Southern Mediterranean\). However, each of these in\ di-)Tj 0.0022 Tc -0.0023 Tw T*(vidual logics is likely embedded in a broader explanation such as those \ out-)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(lined in our broader hypotheses.)Tj 0.0085 Tc -0.00861 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (What is also notable is that while EU commercial treatment of the coun-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1736 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (terpart varies by case it does not, again with the exception of Eastern)Tj 0.01241 Tc -0.0125 Tw T*(Europe, seem to vary across time. Once the EU has gone down a particular\ )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.24271 Tw T*(path of commercial treatment with a counterpart region, it seems to)Tj 0.1992 Tw T*(remain on that path. Even in EU relations with ACP countries, Lom\216)Tj 0.01649 Tc -0.0166 Tw T*(appears to be giving way to a subdivided set of interregional relationsh\ ips)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.03661 Tw T*(with the constituent African, Caribbean, and Paci\336c pieces of the for\ mer)Tj 0.0007 Tw T*(regime. This suggests that the logic that determines EU commercial treat\ -)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(ment of various counterpart regions tends to be stable over time.)Tj /F4 1 Tf 0.0058 Tc -0.00591 Tw 10 0 0 10 126.1811 428.8862 Tm [(4)-1197.3(Evaluating hypotheses of interregional regime evolution)]TJ /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.05409 Tw 9 0 0 9 126.1811 408.3862 Tm (When we outlined a set of four approaches and allied hypotheses in the)Tj 0.01109 Tc -0.0112 Tw T*(introduction, we did so not with the expectation that any one hypothesis\ ,)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.06599 Tw T*(and the set of variables it focuses on, could either fully describe or f\ ully)Tj 0.0782 Tw T*(explain interregional regime outcomes. Although it may not be descrip-)Tj 0.0031 Tc -0.0032 Tw T*(tively satisfying to have a single explanation based on one or two varia\ bles,)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.0126 Tw T*(our approach to this point has been to assess the contributions of the d\ if-)Tj -0.0157 Tw T*(ferent deductive approaches we have identi\336ed. In this section we dis\ cuss)Tj 0.0159 Tc -0.01601 Tw T*(whether interregionalism could be a stable equilibrium approach to inter\ -)Tj 0.0114 Tc -0.0116 Tw T*(national economic organization from the relatively simple deductive logi\ c)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.10429 Tw T*(of the given hypotheses, and then make some brief suggestions of how)Tj 0.0112 Tc -0.01131 Tw T*(future research could pursue more complex reasoning based on more mul-)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(ticausal explanations.)Tj /F4 1 Tf 0.0058 Tc -0.006 Tw 2.2222 TL T*(Interest group hypothesis)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.01289 Tw 1.6111 TL T*(The cases suggest a number of tentative conclusions regarding this hypo-\ )Tj 0.0083 Tc -0.00841 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(thesis. The over-time element of interest group involvement \320 and par\ ticu-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.12041 Tw T*(larly that of business groups \320 is important. A consistent feature ac\ ross)Tj 0.0197 Tw T*(cases is that business group enthusiasm for, and participation in, inter\ re-)Tj 0.2114 Tw T*(gional regimes start high and then wane over time. The trajectory of)Tj 0.0034 Tc -0.00349 Tw T*(European business support seems to be similar to that of EU interest ove\ rall)Tj 0.011 Tc -0.01109 Tw T*(in these regimes. This suggests that business support, and perhaps the l\ ack)Tj 0.0105 Tc -0.0106 Tw T*(of a countervailing coalition, is strongly associated with the establish\ ment)Tj 0.01221 Tc -0.0123 Tw T*(of strong regimes, particularly in the development of binding regime rul\ es)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(but also in the viability of regime institutions.)Tj /F3 1 Tf 8 0 0 8 274.1225 663.1211 Tm (Vinod K. Aggarwal and Edward A. Fogarty)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 19.5239 0 Td (225)Tj ET 1 g /R14 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R99 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (10EUTS-CH08\(207-240\) 19/12/03 4:49 PM Page 225)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R14 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 190 0 obj 6498 endobj 191 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 192 0 obj << /Length 193 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R14 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R40 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.0063 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 136.181 638.3862 Tm (The role of interest groups is greater than we originally expected in th\ e)Tj 0.0864 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (nature of regimes. Certain interest groups can bene\336t handsomely from\ )Tj 0.0545 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(developmental provisions of regimes \(e.g., banana and sugar interests i\ n)Tj 0.011 Tc -0.01109 Tw T*(Lom\216\), and civil society organizations \(e.g., environmental, human \ rights,)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1225 Tw T*(and development groups, etc.\) can be effective in shaping the range of)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(issues involved. )Tj 0.006 Tc -0.0119 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Their role in shaping commercial treatment of the counterpart, however,)Tj -0.00031 Tc -0.0056 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (is somewhat less clear. There is no doubt that highly in\337uential, hig\ hly pro-)Tj 0.0114 Tc 0.0988 Tw T*(tected industries such as agriculture have been successful in shaping th\ e)Tj -0.005 Tc -0.0009 Tw T*(EU\325s commercial treatment of counterparts, and that variation in unif\ ormity)Tj 0.01131 Tc 0.0087 Tw T*(of treatment within \(and across\) counterpart regions re\337ects in sig\ ni\336cant)Tj 0.0027 Tc -0.00861 Tw T*(part the nature of the interest coalitions that mobilize to shape the re\ levant)Tj 0.01131 Tc 0.009 Tw T*(commercial policies. But interest groups seem to have little in\337uence\ over)Tj 0.0432 Tw T*(the particular trade types \320 interregional, bilateral, or a mix of th\ e two. A)Tj 0.00771 Tc -0.0136 Tw T*(lack of interest group in\337uence on this front of course does not unde\ rmine)Tj -0.0038 Tc -0.00211 Tw T*(the hypothesis as a whole, but it does suggest that to explain this elem\ ent of)Tj -0.00011 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(an interregional regime we need to look elsewhere.)Tj 0.0079 Tc -0.008 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Two key factors in this hypothesis are preference intensity and mobiliza\ -)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.05881 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (tion. Those actors whose preferences are intense \320 most notably, prot\ ec-)Tj 0.03529 Tw T*(tionist-oriented sectors such as agriculture or textiles \320 are most l\ ikely to)Tj 0.1839 Tw T*(overcome collective action problems and mobilize effectively to shape)Tj 0.0162 Tc -0.0163 Tw T*(regime characteristics. The creation of interregional institutions to re\ duce)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0307 Tw T*(collective action costs among business groups in particular seems to be \ a)Tj 0.0132 Tc -0.01331 Tw T*(general feature of EU interregional regimes, but these have not necessar\ ily)Tj 0.00549 Tc -0.0056 Tw T*(made mobilization more effective. If interregional regime bene\336ts for\ some)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.04179 Tw T*(interest groups remain diffuse \(and moderate\) and the costs remain con\ -)Tj 0.1017 Tw T*(centrated \(and high\), these latter groups will continue to mobilize re\ la-)Tj 0.0126 Tw T*(tively effectively against liberalizing interregional regimes just as th\ ey do)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(against global agreements.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1369 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Overall, there is little speci\336c evidence )Tj /F3 1 Tf 0 Tw 19.7249 0 Td (against )Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.1369 Tw 3.7097 0 Td (a pluralist hypothesis:)Tj 0.0914 Tw -24.4346 -1.2778 Td (strong interest group support is correlated with the rise of interregion\ al)Tj -0.0132 Tw T*(regimes in our cases, and the decline of this balance of positive suppor\ t is)Tj 0.067 Tw T*(correlated with their failure to move forward. However, this is more rel\ -)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(evant for regime strength than nature or commercial treatment.)Tj /F4 1 Tf 0.0058 Tc -0.006 Tw 2.2222 TL T*(Bureaucratic politics hypothesis)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.0157 Tc -0.01579 Tw 1.6111 TL T*(The cases tend to con\336rm two oft-noted truths regarding the instituti\ onal)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1821 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(state of affairs within the European Union. First, the Council remains)Tj 0.02609 Tw T*(\336rmly in control of the strategic agenda, and this is likely to remai\ n true)Tj 0.0493 Tw T*(after the adoption of the new constitution. Any future European foreign)Tj 0.0139 Tc -0.01401 Tw T*(minister will report to the Council, not the Commission, limiting the ro\ le)Tj 0.0034 Tc -0.00349 Tw T*(of the Commission to implementing rather than shaping the EU\325s relati\ ons)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.2276 Tw T*(with other countries. Second, the Commission is institutionally more )Tj 0.01089 Tc -0.011 Tw T*(pro-free trade and pro-interregionalism than the Council, but is hampere\ d)Tj 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8 0 0 8 127.181 663.1211 Tm (226)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 2.6057 0 Td (EU Trade Strategies)Tj ET 1 g /R14 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R40 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (10EUTS-CH08\(207-240\) 19/12/03 4:49 PM Page 226)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R14 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 193 0 obj 6827 endobj 194 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 195 0 obj << /Length 196 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R14 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R7 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.0925 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 126.1811 638.3862 Tm (in promoting this agenda within the EU due largely to its own internal)Tj 0.15829 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(divisions \(e.g., a \322strategic\323 External Relations DG versus a lib\ eralizing)Tj 0.17909 Tw T*(Trade DG, versus a protectionist Agriculture DG, versus an \322altruisti\ c\323)Tj 0.036 Tw T*(Development DG\). External Relations and Trade DGs seem to be gaining)Tj 0.1035 Tw T*(the upper hand over time, suggesting that, while internal ructions may)Tj -0.0074 Tw T*(continue, the Commission is likely to become more uni\336ed in its suppo\ rt)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(of liberalizing international regimes in the future.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.23399 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Bureaucratic politics \320 and especially the level of intra-Commission)Tj 0.01241 Tc -0.0125 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (debate \320 seems to be a stronger determinant of regime nature than we \ had)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0152 Tw T*(anticipated. Having comprehensive regimes \(which are the norm\) is con-\ )Tj -0.0128 Tw T*(sistent with the need to keep all DGs happy, while the tendency for thes\ e)Tj 0.06889 Tw T*(regimes to become somewhat less preferential and more consistent with)Tj -0.0134 Tw T*(free-trade thinking and WTO strictures \336ts with the notion of the rel\ ative)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(rise of the External Relations and Trade DGs.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.24609 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (However, as expected, bureaucratic politics seems less important to)Tj 0.0074 Tc -0.00751 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (regime strength and counterpart treatment. In a couple of cases the EC h\ as)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0321 Tw T*(acted as a )Tj /F3 1 Tf 5.0331 0 Td (de facto)Tj /F2 1 Tf 3.8777 0 Td (secretariat for an interregional regime, a situation that)Tj 0.00349 Tc -0.0036 Tw -8.9108 -1.2778 Td (may suit the Commission well enough \320 and might actually hinder the c\ re-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.3195 Tw T*(ation of viable, truly interregional institutions. Meanwhile, while as)Tj 0.0163 Tc -0.0164 Tw T*(expected the Council eclipses the Commission with regard to commercial)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0504 Tw T*(treatment, this is less a re\337ection of inter-bureaucratic competition\ than)Tj 0.12019 Tw T*(broader strategic concerns. However, we tended to underemphasize the)Tj 0.00951 Tc -0.0096 Tw T*(degree to which the Commission prefers to bargain with collectivities \(\ i.e.,)Tj 0.008 Tc -0.00819 Tw T*(to prefer pure interregionalism to multi-bilaterals in commercial treatm\ ent)Tj 0.0032 Tc -0.0033 Tw T*(of the counterpart\), especially when the counterpart region involves a \ large)Tj 0.01379 Tc -0.0139 Tw T*(number of countries. But this factor is more a function of bargaining pr\ ef-)Tj 0.0154 Tc -0.0155 Tw T*(erences than policy preferences \320 though it is still notable as a mot\ ivation)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(for an interregional approach.)Tj /F4 1 Tf 0.0058 Tc -0.00591 Tw 2.2222 TL T*(Systemic hypotheses: balancing and nesting)Tj 0 Tc 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 323.4627 311.0363 Tm (1)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00459 Tc -0.0047 Tw 9 0 0 9 126.1811 293.3862 Tm (The cases show that an analytical distinction between structural power a\ nd)Tj 0.00681 Tc -0.0069 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(relational power is essential.)Tj 0 Tc 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 246.1546 285.0363 Tm (2)Tj 0.00681 Tc -0.0069 Tw 9 0 0 9 252.1345 281.8862 Tm (The EU is a paradigmatic example of an actor)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.058 Tw -13.9948 -1.2778 Td (that has far less structural power in the international political-econom\ ic)Tj 0.00349 Tc -0.0036 Tw T*(system than relational power in speci\336c interregional relationships. \ A focus)Tj 0.0002 Tc -0.00031 Tw T*(on the latter would suggest a direct relationship between the EU\325s re\ lational)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1837 Tw T*(power in an interregional regime and its willingness to pursue such a)Tj 0.0228 Tw T*(regime, for the simple reason that it would be better placed to de\336ne\ the)Tj 0.04961 Tw T*(relevant elements of the regime. The cases generally support this predic\ -)Tj 0.0137 Tc -0.01379 Tw T*(tion, particularly with respect to its commercial treatment of counterpa\ rts)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.175 Tw T*(\(especially trade treatment, but also uniformity\) and overt support fo\ r)Tj 0.0041 Tc -0.0042 Tw T*(counterpart coherence in cases where this coherence is unthreatening \(e\ .g.,)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(EU\320MERCOSUR vs. EU\320North America\).)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.0027 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (With reference to structural power, however, the EU appears a far more)Tj 0.0069 Tc -0.007 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (reactive interregionalist. The extent to which EU initiatives mirror tho\ se of)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 8 0 0 8 274.1225 663.1211 Tm (Vinod K. Aggarwal and Edward A. Fogarty)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 19.5239 0 Td (227)Tj ET 1 g /R14 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R7 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (10EUTS-CH08\(207-240\) 19/12/03 4:49 PM Page 227)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R14 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 196 0 obj 7022 endobj 197 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 198 0 obj << /Length 199 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R14 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R84 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.01939 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 127.181 638.3862 Tm (the United States is one way to evaluate the EU\325s concern with struct\ ural)Tj 0.2155 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(power. There is clear evidence that the EU is motivated by structural )Tj 0.02409 Tw T*(power concerns, as it in many cases pursues arrangements in response to \ )Tj 0.1577 Tw T*(U.S. initiatives: ASEM after APEC, EMIFCA after FTAA; and EU\320Mexico )Tj 0.16389 Tw T*(after NAFTA. Notably, ASEM bogged down after APEC did so; the EU\320)Tj 0.05299 Tw T*(MERCOSUR process slowed down after FTAA did so; and the EU\320Mexico)Tj 0.09689 Tw T*(FTA was successfully completed after NAFTA came into effect. The only)Tj 0.0119 Tc -0.01199 Tw T*(way to demonstrate that structural power concerns are not relevant would\ )Tj 0.01649 Tc -0.0166 Tw T*(be if the United States pursued regimes and EU failed to respond; we hav\ e)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(not seen this.)Tj 0.0054 Tc -0.00549 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Meanwhile, the EU has been surprisingly inattentive to nesting consider-\ )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0405 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (ations, despite consistent rhetorical support for the need to ensure WTO\ )Tj 0.015 Tc -0.01511 Tw T*(consistency. The major exception to this general lack of concern has bee\ n)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.01871 Tw T*(the case of Lom\216. In this situation, the EU chose to abandon this hig\ hly-)Tj 0.26221 Tw T*(institutionalized, broad-based arrangement, seeking to replace it with)Tj 0.0061 Tc -0.0062 Tw T*(WTO-friendly arrangements with the African, Caribbean, and Paci\336c cou\ n-)Tj 0.0144 Tc -0.0145 Tw T*(tries as its con\337icts over bananas with the United States heated up \(\ driven)Tj 0.00369 Tc -0.0038 Tw T*(in part by the stronger dispute settlement mechanism after the mid-1990s\ \).)Tj 0.013 Tc -0.01311 Tw T*(More cynically, in the case of Lom\216, nesting considerations may also \ have)Tj 0.0078 Tc -0.0079 Tw T*(provided a ready excuse for the EU to abandon an agreement that was pro-\ )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.01781 Tw T*(viding rapidly declining returns. With the other cases, however, the EU\325\ s)Tj 0.01649 Tc -0.0166 Tw T*(interregional arrangements \(EMIFCA, EMP, and ASEM\) got off the ground)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.149 Tw T*(after the creation of the WTO in 1995, but WTO-compliance does not)Tj 0.02811 Tw T*(appear to be an important issue because these regimes are so weak. From)Tj 0.16119 Tw T*(this perspective, then, interregionalism can be seen as posing )Tj /F3 1 Tf 0 Tw 31.3172 0 Td (less)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.1613 Tw 2.0689 0 Td (of a)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw -33.3861 -1.2778 Td (threat to the global regime than we might have expected. )Tj /F4 1 Tf 0.0058 Tc -0.006 Tw 2.2222 TL T*(Constructivist hypothesis)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.2368 Tw 1.6111 TL T*(In general, this hypothesis is hard to evaluate. Most cases \336nd some)Tj 0.01379 Tc -0.0139 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(support for the idea that the EU is seeking to shape its external identi\ ty in)Tj 0.0025 Tc -0.00259 Tw T*(interregional regimes, particularly in its explicit support for the coal\ escence)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.07829 Tw T*(of counterpart regions \320 most notably with MERCOSUR but also in East)Tj 0.2816 Tw T*(Asia and the Southern Mediterranean. However, it is dif\336cult to tell)Tj 0.0016 Tc -0.00169 Tw T*(whether these activities are motivated primarily by promotion of EU orga\ n-)Tj 0.004 Tc -0.0041 Tw T*(izational forms or whether they are serving less metaphysical interests \ such)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(as those identi\336ed in the other hypotheses.)Tj 0.0004 Tc 0.01311 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (As we expected, identity concerns seem more important in regime nature)Tj 0.1122 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (than in either strength or counterpart treatment. The comprehensive and)Tj -0.00211 Tc -0.01469 Tw T*(developmental or quasi-developmental nature of most of these interregion\ al)Tj 0.0005 Tc 0.0376 Tw T*(regimes is consistent with the notion that the EU seeks to replicate its\ own)Tj -0.0126 Tc -0.0042 Tw T*(internal developments \(e.g., shared social and political goals, structu\ ral funds\))Tj -0.00771 Tc -0.00909 Tw T*(in its relations with counterparts. The EU has not sought to hide the fa\ ct that)Tj -0.0062 Tc -0.0106 Tw T*(these elements of the nature of its interregional regimes provide a cont\ rast to)Tj -0.01109 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(the more commercially-minded transregionalism of the United States. )Tj 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8 0 0 8 127.181 663.1211 Tm (228)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 2.6057 0 Td (EU Trade Strategies)Tj ET 1 g /R14 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R84 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (10EUTS-CH08\(207-240\) 19/12/03 4:49 PM Page 228)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R14 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 199 0 obj 6770 endobj 200 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 201 0 obj << /Length 202 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R14 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R24 gs /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 0 Tr 8 0 0 8 274.1225 663.1211 Tm (Vinod K. Aggarwal and Edward A. Fogarty)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 19.5239 0 Td (229)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.25951 Tw 9 0 0 9 135.3621 638.3862 Tm (However, there is also some evidence that ideas and identity have)Tj 0.004 Tc -0.0041 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (in\337uenced some elements of interregional regime strength and commerci\ al)Tj 0.00999 Tc -0.0101 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(treatment. The EU has been quite consistent in its support of interregio\ nal)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.05679 Tw T*(institutions that treat the two sides as equals, a move that promotes th\ e)Tj 0.00951 Tc -0.0096 Tw T*(pure \336ction of institutional \(or material\) equality of the counterp\ art to the)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.045 Tw T*(EU and that, in conferring a certain status on the counterpart, replicat\ es)Tj 0.097 Tw T*(and reinforces the EU model. This motivation may help explain the far)Tj 0.0083 Tw T*(higher institutionalization of these regimes relative to their rule bind\ ing-)Tj 0.1172 Tw T*(ness. Cooperative forums must exist before their participants can enact)Tj -0.00011 Tc 0 Tw T*(mutually acceptable rules; the Treaty of Rome, for instance, was not bui\ lt in)Tj 0.00549 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(a day.)Tj 0.0249 Tc -0.00841 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Meanwhile, similar motivations may help explain the pursuit of inter-)Tj 0.03371 Tc 0.15491 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (regional trade types when economic and political differences among)Tj 0.32719 Tw T*(counterparts might have suggested a more differential approach \320)Tj 0.17999 Tw T*(perhaps most notably with respect to the countries of the Southern)Tj 0.0974 Tw T*(Mediterranean. Still, in most cases these types of considerations were)Tj 0.2863 Tw T*(likely secondary in the minds of EU policymakers and in shaping)Tj 0.0222 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(outcomes more generally.)Tj 0.0052 Tc -0.00529 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (There is little to suggest that EU policymakers have sought to use inter\ re-)Tj 0.0096 Tc -0.0097 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (gionalism to promote an internal European identity. However, while there\ )Tj 0.0162 Tc -0.0163 Tw T*(is little positive-case evidence for this, the main negative case \320 E\ U\320North)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0985 Tw T*(America \320 is an exception. Anti-Americanism is an increasingly popula\ r)Tj 0.00169 Tc -0.0018 Tw T*(position across much of Europe, perhaps more so among publics than more)Tj 0.0136 Tc -0.0137 Tw T*(pragmatic leaders, and if nothing else is certainly consistent with the \ EU\325s)Tj T*(skeptical position toward any sort of formal regime with the United Stat\ es)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0172 Tw T*(\(or NAFTA\). Whether anti-Americanism is seen as a useful and legitimat\ e)Tj 0.05231 Tw T*(means to promote either or both Europe\325s internal and external identi\ ty)Tj 0.02789 Tw T*(remains unclear, but it could provide a boost to EU interregionalism as \ a)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(general strategy.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1694 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (As we suggested above, while evaluating hypotheses that focus on a)Tj 0.00729 Tc -0.0074 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (narrow set of explanatory factors helps us to understand whether there i\ s a)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.13631 Tw T*(dominant logic to interregionalism, we may be able to gain more real-)Tj 0.06039 Tw T*(world verisimilitude from combining them. Given the basic approaches,)Tj 0.1304 Tw T*(several combinations could obviously be developed that bring together)Tj 0.13651 Tw T*(two, three or more hypotheses. Here, we simply provide an illustrative)Tj 0.01131 Tc -0.0114 Tw T*(discussion to indicate the directions that one might undertake in attemp\ t-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1254 Tw T*(ing to systematically combine hypotheses in future research to provide)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(richer explanations of interregional outcomes.)Tj 0.01019 Tc -0.0103 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (One combination links interest group politics with bureaucratic politics\ .)Tj 0.0078 Tc -0.0079 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (This approach addresses the key question of how interest groups overcome\ )Tj 0.0025 Tc -0.00259 Tw T*(collective action problems in effective mobilization, and how bureaucrac\ ies)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.2636 Tw T*(pursue actual policy goals \320 rather than merely seeking control over)Tj 0 Tw T*(processes.)Tj 0 Tc 5.85 0 0 5.85 169.005 158.5363 Tm (3)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0063 Tw 9 0 0 9 175.2574 155.3862 Tm (As identi\336ed above, a pure pluralist approach tends to assume)Tj 0.3309 Tw -5.4328 -1.2778 Td (that mobilization will occur if the incentives are right. But from a)Tj ET 1 g /R14 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R24 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (10EUTS-CH08\(207-240\) 19/12/03 4:49 PM Page 229)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R14 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 202 0 obj 6763 endobj 203 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 204 0 obj << /Length 205 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R14 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R58 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.01041 Tc -0.0105 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 127.181 638.3862 Tm (combined perspective, we get a more agency-centered explanation for suc-\ )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0377 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(cessful mobilization: state actors \320 particularly the Commission, but\ also)Tj 0.0159 Tc -0.01601 Tw T*(the national governments and the Council \320 facilitate the mobilizatio\ n of)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0349 Tw T*(interest groups by courting them, funding them, and giving them privil-)Tj -0.0126 Tw T*(eged access to policymaking process, which will then tend to increase th\ e)Tj 0.00729 Tc -0.0074 Tw T*(authority of the institution that makes itself the center of activity fo\ r these)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0675 Tw T*(groups. Reciprocally, these institutions do not necessarily have inheren\ t)Tj 0.0717 Tw T*(interests regarding commercial policy, so the makeup of whatever coali-)Tj 0.0061 Tc -0.0062 Tw T*(tions they embrace provides a clearer sense over what actual policy deba\ tes)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.22411 Tw T*(are at the core of inter-bureaucratic contestation. An example of this )Tj 0.2202 Tw T*(with respect to interregionalism is the case when various DGs in the)Tj 0.0127 Tc -0.0128 Tw T*(Commission sought to protect the Lom\216 regime. They did so because the\ y)Tj 0.01019 Tc -0.0103 Tw T*(were jealous of their own prerogatives within this regime, but only as l\ ong)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0762 Tw T*(as they were able to maintain a critical mass of support among relevant)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(interest groups \(banana importers, development NGOs, etc.\). )Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.0089 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (A bureaucratic politics approach linked to a realist view provides a con\ -)Tj 0.00169 Tc -0.0018 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (trast to both a pure systemic power-based argument that sees a uni\336ed\ state)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.10941 Tw T*(interest driven by a country\325s relative capabilities in the system an\ d an)Tj -0.009 Tw T*(internally driven, \322all politics is local politics\323 combination we\ have seen)Tj 0.1076 Tw T*(of interest groups and bureaucratic politics. This perspective focuses o\ n)Tj 0.0134 Tc -0.0135 Tw T*(how bureaucracies get their substantive interests from external pressure\ s \320)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.03371 Tw T*(and explores how policymakers located in speci\336c domestic institution\ al)Tj 0.0134 Tc -0.0135 Tw T*(environments respond to the challenges and opportunities in the interna-\ )Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.0127 Tw T*(tional system. The preferences and implementation of interregional strat\ -)Tj 0.0002 Tw T*(egies are shaped by the contrasting responses of the Commission and the)Tj 0.0106 Tc -0.0107 Tw T*(Council to the question of how to use the EU\325s relational power in sp\ eci\336c)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.10091 Tw T*(interregional relationships to promote the EU\325s overall structural po\ wer)Tj 0.0136 Tc 0 Tw T*(\(particularly )Tj /F3 1 Tf 6.1626 0 Td (vis-\210-vis)Tj /F2 1 Tf -0.0137 Tw 3.9818 0 Td (the United States\). The advantage of this approach is)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0182 Tw -10.1445 -1.2778 Td (that a straight realist focus )Tj /F3 1 Tf 13.2284 0 Td (a la)Tj /F2 1 Tf 2.0678 0 Td (Kenneth Waltz implies an )Tj /F3 1 Tf 0 Tw 12.9173 0 Td (undifferentiated)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00301 Tc -0.0031 Tw -28.2135 -1.2778 Td (response by the EU \322state.\323)Tj 0 Tc 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 241.6616 308.0363 Tm (4)Tj 0.00301 Tc -0.0031 Tw 9 0 0 9 247.6191 304.8862 Tm (By bringing the Council\320Commission tensions)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.2001 Tw -13.382 -1.2778 Td (into the mix, one could explain why they often clash in their policy)Tj 0.0067 Tc -0.00681 Tw T*(responses. Thus, although both the Council and Commission have reasons)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.01421 Tw T*(to support an interregional approach for power reasons, the Commission)Tj 0.01199 Tw T*(clearly has a vested interest in negotiations since it is at the center \ of the)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(process, while the Council tries to hold the Commission back.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.047 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (A combination of realism and constructivism also takes us beyond the)Tj 0.08051 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (systemically driven imperatives of the international system. Akin to the\ )Tj 0.0087 Tc -0.0088 Tw T*(work of Stephen Krasner in his book )Tj /F3 1 Tf 17.479 0 Td (Defending the National Interest)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0 Tc 0 Tw 13.8492 0 Td (,)Tj 5.85 0 0 5.85 411.7967 216.0363 Tm (5)Tj 0.0088 Tc -0.0089 Tw 9 0 0 9 417.7881 212.8863 Tm (in this)Tj -32.2897 -1.2778 Td (view systemic imperatives are underspeci\336ed: one cannot derive clear \ pref-)Tj 0.011 Tc -0.01109 Tw T*(erences about trade policy choices and the speci\336c choice of interreg\ ional-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.05991 Tw T*(ism versus some other mode of interaction by simply looking at relative)Tj 0.0374 Tw T*(systemic capabilities. For Krasner, U.S. policy is ideologically determi\ ned)Tj 0.0074 Tc -0.00751 Tw T*(and led by state policymakers\325 perception of U.S. interests. In our c\ ase, this)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.14639 Tw T*(approach focuses on the EU\325s struggle to de\336ne its place in the wo\ rld,)Tj 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8 0 0 8 127.181 663.1211 Tm (230)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 2.6057 0 Td (EU Trade Strategies)Tj ET 1 g /R14 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R58 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (10EUTS-CH08\(207-240\) 19/12/03 4:49 PM Page 230)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R14 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 205 0 obj 7414 endobj 206 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 207 0 obj << /Length 208 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R14 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R13 gs /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 0 Tr 8 0 0 8 274.1225 663.1211 Tm (Vinod K. Aggarwal and Edward A. Fogarty)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 19.5239 0 Td (231)Tj 0.00751 Tc -0.0076 Tw 9 0 0 9 127.1811 638.3862 Tm (speci\336cally against the United States. As a military pygmy, the EU ha\ s only)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0632 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(two real sources of power: its economic power and its normative power.)Tj 0.0137 Tc -0.01379 Tw T*(Cognizant of this constraint, EU policymakers may use commercial policy)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.0154 Tw T*(in a grander sense to change the rules of the game internationally by pr\ o-)Tj 0.05611 Tw T*(moting the legitimacy of its commercial-democratic model as a counter-)Tj 0.20419 Tw T*(point to the U.S. commercial-military model. The combination would)Tj 0.01691 Tc -0.017 Tw T*(argue that interregionalism plays to the EU\325s strengths: it applies t\ he EU\325s)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0042 Tw T*(commercial strength and appeal as a trading partner to ful\336ll its des\ ire to)Tj 0.0114 Tc -0.01151 Tw T*(promote the EU\325s own values and institutional forms abroad.)Tj 0 Tc 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 388.7806 549.5363 Tm (6)Tj 0.0114 Tc -0.01151 Tw 9 0 0 9 394.7878 546.3862 Tm (At the same)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.01469 Tw -29.7341 -1.2778 Td (time, the focus on realism may oversell the extent of EU\320US competiti\ on,)Tj 0.0027 Tw T*(which at this point is still at a fairly shallow level, as opposed to a \ milder)Tj 0.01379 Tc -0.0139 Tw T*(competition of ideas in the international system about appropriate modes\ )Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(for organizing the international trading system.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.11391 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Another possible combination is that of the bureaucratic politics and)Tj 0.1998 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (constructivist hypotheses. This resembles a sociological institutionalis\ t)Tj 0.10539 Tw T*(approach, highlighting the interplay between EU bureaucracies and the)Tj 0.0976 Tw T*(normative-institutional environments both within and outside Europe.)Tj 0 Tc 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 441.8235 457.5363 Tm (7)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.05589 Tw 9 0 0 9 127.1811 442.8862 Tm (The focus, as in a realist-constructivist combination, is on how EU com-\ )Tj 0.01199 Tc -0.0121 Tw T*(mercial policy promotes institutional change in the international politi\ cal)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.009 Tw T*(economy; the difference here is that outcomes are more closely identi\336\ ed)Tj 0.0517 Tw T*(with perceptions of the )Tj /F3 1 Tf 0 Tw 11.7711 0 Td (appropriateness)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.0517 Tw 7.3089 0 Td (of institutional change. Here, the)Tj 0.1116 Tw -19.0799 -1.2778 Td (Council\320Commission struggle is to de\336ne the appropriate locus of g\ ov-)Tj 0.1376 Tw T*(ernance in an unstable EU institutional \336eld caught between state and\ )Tj 0.21919 Tw T*(supranational units, and their competition and its possible resolution )Tj 0.0005 Tw T*(\(e.g., in EU treaties\) are revisited and reproduced on the global stag\ e. The)Tj 0.0806 Tw T*(relevant question for EU interregionalism, then, would be how ongoing)Tj 0.1577 Tw T*(Council\320Commission competition affects and is affected by the organ-)Tj 0.1468 Tw T*(ization of the international political economy through EU cooperation)Tj 0.01511 Tw T*(with other actors. Within the EU, the Council is exemplar of cooperative\ )Tj 0.1111 Tw T*(interstate multilateralism, an approach that is institutionally consiste\ nt)Tj -0.01489 Tw T*(with the prevailing state-to-state multilateralism of the WTO in the int\ er-)Tj 0.0049 Tc -0.005 Tw T*(national trade regime. However, if the Commission grows in stature withi\ n)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.08549 Tw T*(the EU, its supranational form and identity could alter the institutiona\ l)Tj 0.15559 Tw T*(dynamics of the international political-economic system by promoting)Tj 0.0016 Tc -0.00169 Tw T*(supranational regionalism throughout the world \320 an institutional dev\ elop-)Tj 0.01421 Tc -0.0143 Tw T*(ment that, if generally realized, would then reinforce the Commission-le\ d)Tj 0.0098 Tc -0.00999 Tw T*(model within Europe.)Tj 0 Tc 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 220.3259 227.5363 Tm (8)Tj 0.0098 Tc -0.0099 Tw 9 0 0 9 226.3234 224.3862 Tm (From this angle, the prevalence and purity of inter-)Tj 0.0002 Tc -0.00031 Tw -11.0158 -1.2778 Td (regionalism would ultimately be a function of the Commission\325s strugg\ le to)Tj 0.0126 Tc -0.0127 Tw T*(create a \336eld of international economic relations that privileges the\ supra-)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(national regional unit over the state unit in multilateral cooperation.)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.0076 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Lastly, we present a triple combination of bureaucratic politics, intere\ st)Tj 0.06171 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (groups, and nesting. This approach raises a fundamental question about)Tj 0.0696 Tw T*(our initial starting point: the view that multilateralism is under \336r\ e and)Tj -0.0127 Tw T*(that the EU \(and other actors such as the United States and Japan, amon\ g)Tj ET 1 g /R14 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R13 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (10EUTS-CH08\(207-240\) 19/12/03 4:49 PM Page 231)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R14 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 208 0 obj 7198 endobj 209 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 210 0 obj << /Length 211 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R14 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R3 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.0098 Tc -0.0099 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 127.181 638.3862 Tm (others\) are pursuing bilateral, regional, and interregional alternative\ s. This)Tj 0.0038 Tc -0.00391 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(combination helps us delve into the basis of EU support for multilateral\ ism)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0367 Tw T*(and the likelihood of erosion in this commitment. This approach can be)Tj 0.0103 Tc -0.01041 Tw T*(seen as a further re\336nement of the pluralist/bureaucratic politics co\ mbina-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1198 Tw T*(tion above. In this instance, the EU trade policymaking process is con-)Tj 0.2171 Tw T*(strained by the EU\325s external legal requirements under the WTO. Put)Tj 0.01151 Tc -0.0116 Tw T*(differently, the Commission is buffeted by competing forces. For example\ ,)Tj 0.0076 Tc -0.00771 Tw T*(on the one hand, it is under pressure from the banana and sugar lobbies \ to)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1476 Tw T*(support the Lom\216 preferential approach. On the other hand, it is con-\ )Tj 0.0155 Tw T*(strained by its longstanding commitment to the GATT/WTO. As we have)Tj 0.0367 Tw T*(seen from John Ravenhill\325s discussion, one must, of course, be carefu\ l in)Tj 0.0114 Tc -0.01151 Tw T*(fully attributing the EU\325s abandonment of Lom\216 simply to nesting c\ onsid-)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.00459 Tw T*(erations. One could also view the high costs of Lom\216 and the concerns\ of)Tj -0.00079 Tw T*(other interest groups who have a vested interest in liberalization throu\ gh)Tj 0.022 Tw T*(the WTO process as driving this change in policy, rather than an institu\ -)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(tional commitment to multilateralism )Tj /F3 1 Tf 18.2584 0 Td (per se)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0 Tw 2.4398 0 Td (. )Tj /F4 1 Tf 0.0058 Tc -0.006 Tw 10 0 0 10 127.181 440.3862 Tm [(5)-1197.3(Evaluating counterpart coherence)]TJ /F2 1 Tf 0.00591 Tc 9 0 0 9 127.181 419.8862 Tm (One of the key concepts that we have considered in connection with inter\ -)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.10451 Tw T*(regional regimes is counterpart coherence. To some extent this concept)Tj 0.10381 Tw T*(only makes sense within a study of EU-centered regimes, given that we)Tj 0.013 Tc -0.01311 Tw T*(measure coherence largely in relative terms to that of the EU itself. Bu\ t we)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.06641 Tw T*(have also considered these cases with other criteria for the coherence o\ f)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(regional blocs and its evolution, as shown in Table 8.2. )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.00529 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (As noted in the introduction to this volume, these criteria are fourfold\ .)Tj 0.0103 Tc -0.01041 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (The \336rst is binary: was the region self-de\336ned, or was it created \ speci\336cally)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0386 Tw T*(for the purpose of engaging with the EU? \(This is a one-off measure tha\ t )Tj 0.2392 Tw T*(is not subject to over-time evolution.\) The second criterion measures)Tj 0.01379 Tc -0.0139 Tw T*(intraregional economic integration: what percentage of the trade of coun\ -)Tj 0.0054 Tc -0.00549 Tw T*(tries within the region is with others in the region as opposed to the r\ est of)Tj 0.0145 Tc -0.0146 Tw T*(the world? The third criterion \320 what percentage of the \322potential\ region\323)Tj 0.0063 Tc -0.00639 Tw T*(is represented in any existing bloc \320 is much more dif\336cult to ass\ ess object-)Tj 0.01469 Tc -0.0148 Tw T*(ively, even for an advanced grouping such as the EU. On this measure, we\ )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.2312 Tw T*(simply draw upon the authors\325 determinations regarding the relevant)Tj 0.00681 Tc -0.0069 Tw T*(counterpart region in their case. The percentage shown is derived by div\ id-)Tj 0.0108 Tc -0.01089 Tw T*(ing the number of countries that are formal members of a regional bloc b\ y)Tj 0.00259 Tc -0.0027 Tw T*(the total number of countries that are perceived to exist within that re\ gion.)Tj 0.01331 Tc -0.0134 Tw T*(The \336nal element of counterpart coherence is the strength of any regi\ onal)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(regime, measured in the same terms as interregional regime strength. )Tj 0.00279 Tc -0.0029 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (These criteria provide rough indicators of four distinct aspects of regi\ onal)Tj 0.0094 Tc -0.00951 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (evolution: the self-generated will to create a regional bloc; the level \ of eco-)Tj 0.0083 Tc -0.00841 Tw T*(nomic integration that shapes incentives to create or strengthen a regio\ nal)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0477 Tw T*(bloc; the presence of cultural, political, and/or geographic cohesion th\ at)Tj 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8 0 0 8 127.181 663.1211 Tm (232)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 2.6057 0 Td (EU Trade Strategies)Tj ET 1 g /R14 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R3 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (10EUTS-CH08\(207-240\) 19/12/03 4:49 PM Page 232)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R14 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 211 0 obj 6833 endobj 212 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 213 0 obj << /Length 214 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R14 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R64 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 0 Tr 8 0 0 8 430.3139 663.1211 Tm (233)Tj ET 0 0 0 1 K 0.75 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R14 gs 172.88 144 m 172.88 645 l S BT /R64 gs /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 0 8 -8 0 164.503 144 Tm (Table 8.2)Tj /F2 1 Tf 5.3704 0 Td (Evolution of counterpart coherence)Tj /F3 1 Tf -5.3704 -2.75 Td [(Relationship)-3798.4(Region )-5205(Distribution )-1518.9(Distribution)-2555.8(% of potential)-1381(% of potential )-710.6(Region regime)-1890.3(Region regime)]TJ 0 -1.25 Td [(\(T = 1 year\))-4066.6(self-de\336ned?)-2964.3(of trade \(% )-1960.4(of trade \(T = 2\))-1184.7(region \(T = 1\))-1583.3(region \(2003\))-1267.7(strength \(T = 1\))-1071.8(strength \(2003\))]TJ 9.2326 -1.25 Td [(\(Y/N/ambiguous\))-861.7(within region\))]TJ ET 0.5 w /R14 gs 222.75 144 m 222.75 645 l S BT /R64 gs 0 8 -8 0 216.503 285 Tm (\(T = 1\))Tj /F2 1 Tf -17.625 -2 Td [(European Union)-1444(Y)-7739.8(64%)-5052(61.4%)-4929.7(50%)-5500.5(71%)-5117(Strong)-4849.8(Strong)]TJ ET /R14 gs 248.75 144 m 248.75 645 l S BT /R64 gs 0 Tw 0 8 -8 0 242.503 144 Tm [(\(1990\))-21716.2(\(2001\))-12414.7(\(2004\))]TJ -0.00571 Tw 0 -2 Td [(Southern Cone)-2123.3(Y)-7739.8(MERCOSUR:)-1152.4(MERCOSUR:)-1902.4(80%)-5500.5(80%)-5117(Medium-strong)-641.9(Medium)]TJ ET /R14 gs 274.75 144 m 274.75 645 l S BT /R64 gs 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 0 8 -8 0 268.503 144 Tm [(\(1995\))-14591.1(18.7%)-4179.6(18%)]TJ 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 0 -2 Td [(East Asia)-5129.9(N/ambiguous)-2036(Intra-ASEAN:)-927.9(Intra-ASEAN: )-1391(67%)-5500.5(87%)-5117(Weak)-5292.1(Weak)]TJ 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 0 -1.25 Td [(\(1996\))-14591.1(22.5%)-4179.6(23.2%)]TJ 0.0056 Tc 2.01559 Tw 17.625 -1.25 Td (Intra-APT: Intra-APT: )Tj ET /R14 gs 320.75 144 m 320.75 645 l S BT /R64 gs 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 0 8 -8 0 314.503 285 Tm [(42%)-5051.9(41%)]TJ 0.0056 Tc 4.62621 Tw -17.625 -2 Td [(Southern N)-7590.8(N/A )-320.5(N/A )-1070.5(90%)-5500.5(90%)-5117(Weak)-5292.1(Weak)]TJ 0 Tw 0 -1.25 Td (Mediterranean)Tj ET /R14 gs 356.75 144 m 356.75 645 l S BT /R64 gs 0 8 -8 0 350.503 144 Tm (\(1995\))Tj -0.00571 Tw 0 -2 Td (ACP \(1975\))Tj /F3 1 Tf 0 Tw 1.1594 -1.25 Td (Africa)Tj /F2 1 Tf -0.00571 Tw 8.0732 0 Td [(N)-7590.8(Sub-Sah: 5.9%)-442.5(Sub-Sah: 10.2%)-612.8(90%)-5500.5(100%)-4537.3(Weak)-5292.1(Weak)]TJ /F3 1 Tf 0 Tw -8.0732 -1.25 Td (Caribbean)Tj /F2 1 Tf 8.0732 0 Td [(N)-7590.8(5.9%)-4759.4(9.3%)-5509.4(90%)-5500.5(98%)-5117(Medium)-3963(Medium-strong)]TJ /F3 1 Tf -8.0732 -1.25 Td (Paci\336c)Tj /F2 1 Tf 8.0732 0 Td [(N)-7590.8(3.6%)-4759.4(2.3%)-5509.4(90%)-5500.5(100%)-4537.3(Medium)-3963(Medium)]TJ /F3 1 Tf -8.0732 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62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 214 0 obj 4869 endobj 215 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 216 0 obj << /Length 217 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R14 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R28 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 0 Tr 8 0 0 8 127.181 663.1211 Tm (234)Tj ET 0 0 0 1 K 0.75 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R14 gs 141.798 144.215 m 141.798 645.215 l S BT /R28 gs /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 0 8 -8 0 133.4202 144.2165 Tm (Table 8.2)Tj /F2 1 Tf 5.3704 0 Td (Evolution of counterpart coherence \320 )Tj /F3 1 Tf 0 Tw 17.8425 0 Td (Continued)Tj -0.00571 Tw -23.2129 -2.75 Td [(Relationship)-2440.8(Region )-5294.7(Distribution )-1751(Distribution)-2752.2(% of potential)-1450.4(% of potential )-734.9(Region regime)-2447.1(Region regime)]TJ 0 -1.25 Td [(\(T = 1 year\))-2709(self-de\336ned?)-3054(of trade \(% )-2192.6(of trade \(T = 2\))-1381.1(region \(T = 1\))-1652.6(region \(2003\))-1292.1(strength \(T = 1\))-1628.6(strength \(2003\))]TJ 7.875 -1.25 Td [(\(Y/N/ambiguous\))-951.4(within region\))]TJ ET 0.5 w /R14 gs 191.668 144.215 m 191.668 645.215 l S BT /R28 gs 0 8 -8 0 185.4202 275.0736 Tm (\(T = 1\))Tj /F2 1 Tf -16.3571 -2 Td (Eastern Europe)Tj 0 Tw 0 -1.25 Td (\(1995\))Tj /F3 1 Tf 1.1594 -1.25 Td (Visegrad)Tj /F2 1 Tf -0.00571 Tw 8.0732 0 Td [(Y)-7739.8(X: 14.5%,)-2543.1(X: 12.3%,)-3293.1(57%)-5500.5(100%)-4537.3(Weak)-5292.1(Weak)]TJ 8.3924 -1.25 Td [(M: 11.2%)-2631.6(M: 9.9%)]TJ /F3 1 Tf 0 Tw -16.4656 -1.25 Td (Baltics)Tj /F2 1 Tf -0.00571 Tw 8.0732 0 Td [(Y/ambiguous)-9309.9(X: 13.5%)]TJ 0 Tw 23.3924 -0.625 Td [(100%)-4920.8(100%)-4537.3(Medium)-3963(Medium)]TJ -0.00571 Tw -7.875 -0.625 Td (M: 6.5%)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0 Tw -23.5906 -1.25 Td (CIS)Tj /F2 1 Tf -0.00571 Tw 8.0732 0 Td [(Y)-7739.8(X: 28%, )-3128.5(X: 21.1%)]TJ 0 Tw 23.3924 -0.625 Td [(100%)-4920.8(100%)-4537.3(Medium-strong)-641.9(Medium-strong)]TJ ET /R14 gs 277.668 144.215 m 277.668 645.215 l S BT /R28 gs -0.00571 Tw 0 8 -8 0 271.4202 285.2165 Tm [(M: 42.6%)-2631.6(I: 37%)]TJ -17.625 -2 Td [(North America)-2264(Y)-7739.8(38.6%)-4179.7(46.2%)-4929.7(67%)-5500.5(100%)-4537.3(CUSFTA: )-3477.4(NAFTA: )]TJ 0 Tw 0 -1.25 Td [(\(1990\))]TJ 47.3885 0 Td [(medium-strong)-659(medium-strong)]TJ 0 -1.25 Td (US/Canada-)Tj ET 0.75 w /R14 gs 324.798 144.215 m 324.798 645.215 l S BT /R28 gs -0.0058 Tw 0 8 -8 0 317.4202 523.3245 Tm (Mexico: low)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0 Tw 0 7 -7 0 338.4202 144.2165 Tm (Sources)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0 Tc 3.1774 0 Td (:)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw -3.1774 -1.2857 Td [(MERCOSUR: CEPAL \(Comisi\227n Ecom\227mica para Am\216rica Latina y el C\ aribe\): Panorama de la Inserci\227n Internacional de Am\216rica Latina \ )0.9(y el Caribe,)]TJ 0 -1.2857 Td [(Santiago de Chile, March 2003, p. 159; WTO Trade Statistics \(http://www\ 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Distribut\ ion of trade \336gures at T = 1 are from 1980.)Tj 0 -1.2857 Td (Eastern Europe:)Tj 0 -1.2857 Td (North America: WTO Trade Statistics \(wto.org/English/res_e/statis_e/sta\ tis_e.htm; accessed June 2003\).)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0 Tw 0 -1.9286 Td (Notes)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0 Tc 2.4508 0 Td (:)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw -2.4508 -1.2857 Td (X = exports, I = imports)Tj ET 1 g /R14 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R28 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (10EUTS-CH08\(207-240\) 19/12/03 4:49 PM Page 234)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w /R14 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 217 0 obj 5646 endobj 218 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 219 0 obj << /Length 220 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R14 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R61 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.0043 Tc -0.00439 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 126.1811 638.3862 Tm (shapes ideas about regional identity and thus bloc membership; and \336n\ ally)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(the degree to which countries have acted on these \322regionalizing\323 \ forces to)Tj T*(formally institutionalize regional cooperation.)Tj 0.0228 Tc 0.2534 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (What do we \336nd? First, very broadly speaking, trade within these)Tj 0.01151 Tc -0.00591 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (regions has grown relative to their overall trade with the rest of the w\ orld.)Tj 0.0228 Tc 0.04739 Tw T*(This evolution in trade distribution is most likely a re\337ection of a \ more)Tj 0.1741 Tw T*(general trend toward regionalization that occurred in the 1990s. Sub-)Tj 0.2348 Tw T*(Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, North America, and East Asia all saw)Tj -0.00349 Tw T*(growth in regional commercial integration. The exceptions to this broad)Tj 0.3483 Tw T*(trend include regions coping with very speci\336c conditions: Eastern)Tj 0.2466 Tw T*(European countries saw a natural gravitation of their trade relations)Tj 0.2122 Tw T*(westward after several decades of Soviet-enforced economic isolation; )Tj 0.13251 Tw T*(and intra-MERCOSUR trade suffered in the late 1990s and early 2000s)Tj 0.00661 Tc -0.00101 Tw T*(from successive \336nancial shocks to the Brazilian and Argentine econom\ ies.)Tj 0.0228 Tc 0.0555 Tw T*(This overall trend toward intraregional trade growth has occurred inde-)Tj 0.0201 Tc -0.0145 Tw T*(pendently of participation in interregional regimes with the EU, but gen\ -)Tj 0.0228 Tc 0.2365 Tw T*(erally increased the incentives for countries in these counterparts to)Tj 0.0085 Tc -0.0029 Tw T*(cooperate on a regional level in any region-to-region engagement with th\ e)Tj 0.01131 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(European Union.)Tj 0.00639 Tc -0.0065 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Second, the percentage of countries participating in counterpart regiona\ l)Tj 0.01289 Tc -0.013 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (regimes that \322belong\323 in those regimes \320 whether for cultural, \ political, or)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.05321 Tw T*(geographic reasons \320 has also tended to grow over time. For instance,\ in)Tj 0.19099 Tw T*(East Asia, the expansion of ASEAN to include the full complement of)Tj 0.03709 Tw T*(Southeast Asian nations \(with the addition of Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos,)Tj 0.0136 Tc -0.0137 Tw T*(and Myanmar\), has made the APT into a more fully \322East Asian\323 gro\ uping)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.2216 Tw T*(\320 though problematic cases such as North Korea and Taiwan are still)Tj 0.0032 Tw T*(excluded. Similarly, North America became \322whole\323 when Mexico join\ ed)Tj 0.4352 Tw T*(the United States and Canada in NAFTA, while Chile\325s continued)Tj 0.1925 Tw T*(standof\336shness toward MERCOSUR kept this grouping from becoming)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(fully representative of the Southern Cone. )Tj 0.002 Tc -0.00211 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (At a general, global level, ever fewer countries are not members of at l\ east)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.09109 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (one regional cooperative arrangement \320 a trend that is in no small pa\ rt)Tj 0.287 Tw T*(connected to the success of the European model of integration. But)Tj 0.04829 Tw T*(whether the EU has been a direct catalyst of counterpart regions\325 coa\ les-)Tj 0.052 Tw T*(cence is much more dif\336cult to discern. On the one hand, the very con\ -)Tj 0.00639 Tc -0.0065 Tw T*(cepts of \322Eastern Europe,\323 \322Southern Mediterranean,\323 and \322\ East Asia\323 exist)Tj 0.01489 Tc -0.015 Tw T*(as they do today to a large extent because of these regions\325 relation\ ship to)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0015 Tw T*(Western Europe \320 Eastern Europe for political-historical and geograph\ ical)Tj 0.0027 Tc -0.00279 Tw T*(reasons, and the Southern Mediterranean and East Asia \(or at least the \ APT\))Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0098 Tw T*(because the EU explicitly decided to engage these groupings as such.)Tj 0 Tc 0 Tw 5.85 0 0 5.85 424.4867 193.0364 Tm (9)Tj 0.01711 Tc 9 0 0 9 430.7701 189.8862 Tm (On)Tj 0.01241 Tw -33.8432 -1.2778 Td (the other hand, the EU has withheld formal engagement in interregional)Tj -0.00259 Tw T*(forums from countries that \322belong\323 in some counterpart regions su\ ch as)Tj 0.0242 Tw T*(Myanmar in ASEM or Cuba in its relationship with Caribbean nations. It)Tj 0.0141 Tc -0.01421 Tw T*(seems likely, then, that the evolution of counterpart regions\325 member\ ship)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 8 0 0 8 274.1225 663.1211 Tm (Vinod K. Aggarwal and Edward A. Fogarty)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 19.5239 0 Td (235)Tj ET 1 g /R14 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R61 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (10EUTS-CH08\(207-240\) 19/12/03 4:49 PM Page 235)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R14 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 220 0 obj 6831 endobj 221 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 222 0 obj << /Length 223 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R14 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R50 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.0101 Tc -0.01019 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 127.181 638.3862 Tm (will remain primarily a function of intraregional dynamics, as the effec\ t of)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(the EU here may remain ambiguous.)Tj 0.0042 Tc -0.0043 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (It is with the third criterion \320 regional regime strength \320 that c\ ounterpart)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.2865 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (engagement with the EU may be most important. Like interregional)Tj 0.0108 Tc -0.01089 Tw T*(regimes, each of these counterpart regimes is typically stronger in term\ s of)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1093 Tw T*(institutionalization than rule bindingness, which is consistent with the\ )Tj 0.00549 Tc -0.0056 Tw T*(idea that regional regimes require some sort of institutional identity i\ f they)Tj 0.00681 Tc -0.0069 Tw T*(are to engage with external actors as a unit. This idea is most clearly \ visible)Tj 0.00101 Tc -0.0011 Tw T*(with MERCOSUR, which began its interregional regime process with the EU)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0623 Tw T*(immediately after it upgraded its own regional bloc to a customs union.)Tj 0.0403 Tw T*(Meanwhile, though there is probably no direct cause\320effect relationsh\ ip,)Tj 0.0909 Tw T*(the establishment of ASEM occurred at the very beginning of a wave of)Tj 0.01089 Tc -0.011 Tw T*(institution building in what had previously, with the exception of ASEAN\ ,)Tj 0.0127 Tc -0.0128 Tw T*(been a very institution-poor region, perhaps paving the way for other Ea\ st)Tj 0.0043 Tc -0.00439 Tw T*(Asian cooperation mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1003 Tw T*(as-yet hypothetical Asian Monetary Fund. These countries\325 and regions\ \325)Tj 0.0065 Tc -0.00661 Tw T*(participation in interregional processes with the EU have generally enco\ ur-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.05009 Tw T*(aged and required region-wide thinking and representation \320 even if t\ he)Tj 0.013 Tc -0.01311 Tw T*(interregional institutions, like regional institutions, are less powerfu\ l than)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0361 Tw T*(they are abundant. That is, the EU can encourage counterpart coherence)Tj 0.00571 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(without having to commit to binding rules simply by encouraging a prolif\ -)Tj 0.0056 Tc T*(eration of interregional institutions.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.02 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (To some extent, however, the evolution of counterpart regions\325 regime\ )Tj 0.0085 Tc -0.00861 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (strength as interregional regime processes proceed is only part of the e\ ffect)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1626 Tw T*(of EU interregionalism. While focusing on regional evolution over the)Tj 0.1254 Tw T*(course of an EU-led process suggests that ongoing interregional negoti-)Tj 0.00951 Tc -0.0096 Tw T*(ations are the catalyst for increased counterpart institutionalization, \ much)Tj -0.00011 Tc 0 Tw T*(of the impetus for this institutionalization may occur before any such i\ nter-)Tj 0.0042 Tc -0.0043 Tw T*(regional process begins. This effect may be somewhat like the requiremen\ ts)Tj 0.0009 Tc -0.00101 Tw T*(of prospective EU members: they are told explicitly what reforms they mu\ st)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0069 Tw T*(undertake \336rst to be worthy of treatment as a future member and later\ to)Tj 0.01601 Tc -0.0161 Tw T*(actually accede to the Union. The parallel is that counterpart regions m\ ay)Tj 0.0074 Tc -0.00751 Tw T*(\336nd that interregional processes can only be begun if counterparts co\ mmit)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.3549 Tw T*(to some degree of intraregional cooperation, and can only proceed)Tj -0.0153 Tw T*(satisfactorily if this cooperation evolves satisfactorily. Thus the EU b\ egins)Tj 0.0043 Tc -0.00439 Tw T*(its interregional process with MERCOSUR once the latter takes a large in\ sti-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.06889 Tw T*(tutional step \(by establishing a customs union\), and proceeds in negot\ i-)Tj 0.3196 Tw T*(ations as MERCOSUR matures \(by enduring major \336nancial shocks\).)Tj 0.01401 Tc -0.0141 Tw T*(Alternatively, similar processes with the Southern Mediterranean and Eas\ t)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0433 Tw T*(Asia slow to different degrees because these regions make relatively lit\ tle)Tj 0.01511 Tc -0.0152 Tw T*(progress in enhancing their intraregional institutional identity. The po\ int)Tj 0.01041 Tc -0.0105 Tw T*(here is that the EU\325s in\337uence on counterpart institutionalization\ through)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.08839 Tw T*(interregional processes may follow a path of initial leaps that are eith\ er)Tj 0.00191 Tc -0.002 Tw T*(consolidated or not, with the trajectory of interregional processes foll\ owing)Tj 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8 0 0 8 127.181 663.1211 Tm (236)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 2.6057 0 Td (EU Trade Strategies)Tj ET 1 g /R14 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R50 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (10EUTS-CH08\(207-240\) 19/12/03 4:49 PM Page 236)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R14 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 223 0 obj 6904 endobj 224 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 225 0 obj << /Length 226 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R14 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R72 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.01041 Tc -0.0105 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 126.1811 638.3862 Tm (that of the counterpart\325s intraregional institutionalization. While t\ his idea)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.07069 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(is speculative, it suggests that the relationship between interregionali\ sm)Tj 0.092 Tw T*(and counterpart coherence is indeed one worth watching closely in the)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(coming years.)Tj /F4 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc -0.00591 Tw 10 0 0 10 126.1811 578.3862 Tm [(6)-1197.4(Further research)]TJ /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.041 Tw 9 0 0 9 126.1811 557.8862 Tm (Our objective in this volume has been to examine the new trend toward)Tj 0.01601 Tc -0.0161 Tw T*(forms of interregionalism in the global economy. Ironically, the strengt\ h-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.09241 Tw T*(ening of the GATT and greater institutionalization of the multiproduct,)Tj 0.0023 Tc -0.0024 Tw T*(multilateral trade regime through the WTO has been accompanied by a rise\ )Tj 0.0029 Tc -0.0031 Tw T*(in bilateralism, regional agreements, sectoral accords, and interregiona\ lism.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0182 Tw T*(Of these \322alternatives to the WTO,\323 the broadest efforts are inter\ regional)Tj 0.0079 Tc -0.008 Tw T*(and transregional. The United States has pursued transregional agreement\ s)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0845 Tw T*(in minilateral forums such as APEC and the FTAA as well as in bilateral)Tj 0.0071 Tc -0.0072 Tw T*(agreements with countries in East Asia and the Middle East, but has show\ n)Tj 0.0101 Tc -0.01019 Tw T*(little interest in a more \322pure\323 interregional approach alongside \ its NAFTA)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0672 Tw T*(partners. The EU, on the other hand, has been particularly active in the\ )Tj 0.11031 Tw T*(interregional game, and is far ahead of any other grouping in pursuing)Tj 0.0148 Tc -0.01489 Tw T*(region-to-region links. The prominence of the EU in this approach should\ )Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.008 Tw T*(hardly be surprising, given that the EU itself is the most institutional\ ized)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(and in\337uential regional bloc.)Tj 0.01421 Tc 0.07269 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (So is there a uni\336ed logic to interregionalism as a general approach \ to)Tj 0.006 Tc -0.009 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (international commercial relationships, and does the experience of the E\ U,)Tj 0.00191 Tc -0.0049 Tw T*(as the \322necessary case\323 of interregionalism, suggest that this app\ roach has a)Tj 0.0087 Tc -0.0117 Tw T*(future? These two questions \320 which form the core of our study \320 a\ re inter-)Tj 0.01421 Tc 0.14799 Tw T*(related and, unfortunately, still dif\336cult to answer unambiguously. T\ he)Tj 0.0096 Tc -0.0126 Tw T*(answer to the \336rst is probably \322no.\323 The variation across our c\ ases suggests)Tj 0.0005 Tc -0.00349 Tw T*(that there are a number of reasons to pursue interregionalism, but that \ they)Tj 0.009 Tc -0.01199 Tw T*(depend signi\336cantly on the context. Interest groups, bureaucracies, p\ ower,)Tj 0.0074 Tc -0.01041 Tw T*(nesting, and identity all matter to some extent and in some circumstance\ s.)Tj -0.00079 Tc -0.0022 Tw T*(Probably the most compelling individual factors are those of interest gr\ oups)Tj 0.0042 Tc -0.0072 Tw T*(worried about the possible rami\336cations of instability in the WTO-cen\ tered)Tj 0.01421 Tc 0.11259 Tw T*(trade regime and of actors\325 concerns about both relative power in tra\ de)Tj -0.0005 Tw T*(negotiations and their overall place in the international economy. But n\ o)Tj 0.0172 Tw T*(single variable or set of variables can adequately capture the complexit\ ies)Tj 0.0114 Tc -0.0144 Tw T*(and subtleties involved in de\336ning and executing trade policies and a\ gree-)Tj 0.01421 Tc -0.0135 Tw T*(ments, so we have identi\336ed several possible combinations of our orig\ inal)Tj -0.01221 Tw T*(hypotheses that might offer a richer, more nuanced assessment of interre\ -)Tj -0.01489 Tw T*(gionalism. The different multicausal approaches would be suited to diffe\ r-)Tj 0.0488 Tw T*(ent aspects of interregionalism as policy and outcome: a policy networks\ )Tj 0.2213 Tw T*(approach would focus on inputs to the trade policymaking process; a)Tj 0.246 Tw T*(bureaucratic-realist or constructivist-realist combination would explore\ )Tj 0.0446 Tw T*(\324state\325-level motivations for pursuing interregionalism; and a soc\ iological)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 8 0 0 8 274.1225 663.1211 Tm (Vinod K. Aggarwal and Edward A. Fogarty)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 19.5239 0 Td (237)Tj ET 1 g /R14 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R72 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (10EUTS-CH08\(207-240\) 19/12/03 4:49 PM Page 237)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R14 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 226 0 obj 6704 endobj 227 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 228 0 obj << /Length 229 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R14 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R18 gs /F2 1 Tf 0.01421 Tc -0.0116 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 127.181 638.3862 Tm (institutionalist approach would explore how the practice of interregiona\ l-)Tj -0.00101 Tc -0.002 Tw 1.2778 TL T*(ism affects the organization of international political-economic coopera\ tion)Tj -0.0024 Tc -0.0006 Tw T*(more generally through the possible proliferation of new supranational g\ ov-)Tj 0.0027 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(ernance units. )Tj 0.00591 Tc -0.006 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (The absence of a uni\336ed, unitary logic for interregionalism hardly me\ ans)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0071 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (that this approach is doomed either conceptually or practically. Even th\ e)Tj 0.01691 Tc -0.017 Tw T*(clearest, most deductively-derived approaches to both policy and analysi\ s)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0206 Tw T*(are based on a dominant logic rather than a single logic. The presence o\ f)Tj 0.0081 Tc -0.00819 Tw T*(evidence for each of the four logics we evaluated \320 as well as for mo\ re mul-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0553 Tw T*(ticausal logics \320 suggests that while it may be dif\336cult to predic\ t speci\336c)Tj 0.0067 Tw T*(interregional regime outcomes, interregionalism as a general approach to\ )Tj 0.0146 Tc -0.01469 Tw T*(commercial policy has the type of broad-based grounding that informs all\ )Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(viable policy choices. It seems that interregionalism is here to stay.)Tj 0.0159 Tc -0.01601 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (This conclusion is borne out by the EU experience. EU-centered interre-)Tj 0.013 Tc -0.01311 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (gional regimes have advanced to varying degrees, and for varying reasons\ .)Tj 0.01489 Tc -0.015 Tw T*(But, except for the special cases of Eastern Europe and North America, t\ he)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1736 Tw T*(EU has over the last decade or so shown a consistent commitment to)Tj 0.0558 Tw T*(organizing its relations with its commercial partners on an interregiona\ l)Tj -0.01331 Tw T*(basis. This commitment has faltered somewhat in some cases, and moved)Tj 0.0002 Tc -0.00031 Tw T*(forward strongly in others. The EU asserts its continued commitment to t\ he)Tj 0.005 Tc -0.0051 Tw T*(multilateral trade regime, but, like the United States, shows no sign of\ fore-)Tj 0.00011 Tc -0.0002 Tw T*(going other options \320 regardless of the ups and downs of the WTO-cent\ ered)Tj 0.0056 Tc 0 Tw T*(system.)Tj 0.0257 Tc 0.09 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (This brings us back to our biggest \322what if\323: what if the multilat\ eral)Tj 0.01649 Tc -0.008 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (trade system falters? What if it does not? In the latter scenario \320 t\ he more)Tj 0.0197 Tc -0.01131 Tw T*(hopeful one, from our point of view \320 interregionalism will likely re\ main)Tj 0.0139 Tc -0.0054 Tw T*(a secondary approach to commercial relations. It is not obvious that mos\ t)Tj 0.0257 Tc 0.04289 Tw T*(regional blocs around the world will have enough incentive to upgrade)Tj 0.03011 Tw T*(their own coherence to the point where they can and will pursue inter-)Tj -0.00819 Tw T*(regionalism on their own. The EU, as we have suggested, will likely con-\ )Tj 0.009 Tw T*(tinue to pursue interregionalism with at least a moderate degree of zeal\ ,)Tj 0.004 Tw T*(driven less by market ef\336ciency imperatives than a desire to promote \ its)Tj 0.00011 Tw T*(political-institutional in\337uence around the world. However, if the Do\ ha)Tj 0.04581 Tw T*(Round of WTO negotiations were to fail, the appeal of an interregional)Tj 0.008 Tw T*(approach \320 as well as for transregional and bilateral approaches \320\ would)Tj 0.01421 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(grow for all.)Tj 0.0018 Tc -0.00191 Tw 1 -1.2778 Td (Indeed, perhaps due to a lingering skepticism about the Doha Round, the)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.1671 Tw -1 -1.2778 Td (general trend toward interregional and transregional arrangements has)Tj 0.12891 Tw T*(accelerated in recent years. As many regional arrangements around the)Tj 0.0383 Tw T*(world become more coherent and develop a more uni\336ed stance in their)Tj 0.00571 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(external commercial policy, understanding the driving forces behind inte\ r-)Tj 0.00459 Tc -0.00481 Tw T*(regionalism is likely to become a crucial theoretical and policy concern\ . EU)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0253 Tw T*(interregionalism may well prove to be only the movie trailer for the ful\ l-)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(blown action that we are about to see.)Tj 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 8 0 0 8 127.181 663.1211 Tm (238)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 2.6057 0 Td (EU Trade Strategies)Tj ET 1 g /R14 gs 91 727 239 -12 re f* BT 0 g /R18 gs /F-1 1 Tf -0.00031 Tc -0.0018 Tw 8 0 0 8 93 717 Tm (10EUTS-CH08\(207-240\) 19/12/03 4:49 PM Page 238)Tj ET 1 G 0.5 w 10 M 0 j 0 J []0 d /R14 gs 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 0 G 0.25 w 90 726 m 90 702 l 60 696 m 84 696 l 481 726 m 481 702 l 511 696 m 487 696 l 90 54 m 90 78 l 60 84 m 84 84 l 481 54 m 481 78 l 511 84 m 487 84 l S 1 G 0.5 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S 0 G 0.25 w 261.5 714 m 309.5 714 l 261.5 66 m 309.5 66 l 72 414 m 72 366 l 499 414 m 499 366 l 285.5 726 m 285.5 702 l 285.5 78 m 285.5 54 l 60 390 m 84 390 l 487 390 m 511 390 l 285.5 714 m 291.5 714 l 291.5 710.688 288.812 708 285.5 708 c 282.188 708 279.5 710.688 279.5 714 c 279.5 717.312 282.188 720 285.5 720 c 288.812 720 291.5 717.312 291.5 714 c 285.5 66 m 291.5 66 l 291.5 62.688 288.812 60 285.5 60 c 282.188 60 279.5 62.688 279.5 66 c 279.5 69.312 282.188 72 285.5 72 c 288.812 72 291.5 69.312 291.5 66 c 72 390 m 78 390 l 78 386.688 75.312 384 72 384 c 68.688 384 66 386.688 66 390 c 66 393.312 68.688 396 72 396 c 75.312 396 78 393.312 78 390 c 499 390 m 505 390 l 505 386.688 502.312 384 499 384 c 495.688 384 493 386.688 493 390 c 493 393.312 495.688 396 499 396 c 502.312 396 505 393.312 505 390 c S endstream endobj 229 0 obj 6711 endobj 230 0 obj << /Type /ExtGState /SA false /SM 0.02 /OP false /op true /OPM 1 >> endobj 231 0 obj << /Length 232 0 R >> stream 1 g 1 i /RelativeColorimetric ri /R14 gs 54 726 m 54 726 l f BT 0 0 0 1 k /R55 gs /F4 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 0 Tr 9 0 0 9 126.1811 638.3862 Tm (Notes)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.01711 Tc 0.0527 Tw 8 0 0 8 126.1811 625.3862 Tm [(1)11.5(.)-616.3(The general international context \320 i.e., events that have transforme\ d interna-)]TJ 0.00751 Tc -0.0076 Tw 1.5 -1.25 Td (tional politics and the global economy such as globalization, the end of\ the Cold)Tj 0.0015 Tc -0.0016 Tw 1.25 TL T*(War, the creation of the WTO, the Asian \336nancial crisis, the Seattle \ WTO ministe-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.19949 Tw T*(rial, and 9/11 \320 is essential to understanding the evolution of inter\ regional)Tj 0.00259 Tc -0.0027 Tw T*(regimes. These events are empirical rather than theoretical explanations\ of actors\325)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.02251 Tw T*(behavior; they are critical junctures that affect the structure of the s\ ystem, and)Tj 0.0071 Tc -0.0072 Tw T*(thus the likely behavior of the EU and other actors therein. But the gen\ eral inter-)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.11011 Tw T*(national context is not a set of factors that belongs exclusively to \322\ systemic\323)Tj 0.01649 Tc -0.0166 Tw T*(hypotheses, because it affects the behavior/interests of the actors give\ n primacy)Tj 0.0136 Tc -0.0137 Tw T*(in all of our hypotheses. Therefore, we focus here speci\336cally on the\ structure of)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0034 Tw T*(the international system in terms of power relations and on EU concerns \ about)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(nesting its trading arrangements within the GATT/WTO. )Tj 0.0099 Tc -0.00999 Tw -1.5 -1.25 Td [(2.)-623.5(We thank Julie Gilson for her elaboration on this distinction within her\ chapter,)]TJ 0.0076 Tc -0.00771 Tw 1.5 -1.25 Td (which clari\336ed our thinking on this matter. On the difference between\ structural)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(and relational power, see Strange 1987.)Tj 0.03371 Tc -0.0141 Tw -1.5 -1.25 Td [(3)11.5(.)-583.1(This pluralist-bureaucratic politics combination resembles the existing \ litera-)]TJ 0.0266 Tc -0.0101 Tw 1.5 -1.25 Td (ture on policy networks \320 noted in the appendix to the introduction \320\ though)Tj 0.03371 Tc 0.0636 Tw T*(here notably with a focus on the EU\325s external policies rather than i\ nternal)Tj 0.34109 Tw T*(ones. On EU policy networks see Peterson 1995, and Stone Sweet and)Tj 0.02229 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(Sandholtz 1997.)Tj 0.0056 Tc -1.5 -1.25 Td [(4.)-627.8(Waltz 1979.)]TJ T*[(5.)-627.8(Krasner 1978.)]TJ 0.0127 Tc -0.0128 Tw T*[(6)7.1(.)-620.7(This line of thinking also bears some resemblance to Joseph Nye\325s elu\ cidation of)]TJ 0.013 Tc -0.01311 Tw 1.5 -1.25 Td (the concept of \322soft power\323 in U.S. international in\337uence, wit\ h soft or normat-)Tj 0.0143 Tc -0.0144 Tw T*(ive power serving as an alternative rather than a complement to military\ power.)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(See Nye 1990. )Tj 0.0168 Tc -0.01691 Tw -1.5 -1.25 Td [(7)11.2(.)-616.6(On sociological institutionalism, see Powell and DiMaggio 1991. Our cons\ truct-)]TJ 0.0159 Tc -0.01601 Tw 1.5 -1.25 Td (ivist hypothesis as initially de\336ned had a sociological institutional\ ist \337avor to it)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.13409 Tw T*(in its identi\336cation of institutional isomorphism. This combination w\ ith the)Tj 0.0051 Tc -0.0052 Tw T*(bureaucratic politics approach, however, invokes the Commission\320Counc\ il strug-)Tj 0.01711 Tc -0.00439 Tw T*(gle for in\337uence more explicitly as a mechanism for change in the ins\ titutional)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.0058 Tw T*(\336eld of international trade relations.)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.0238 Tw -1.5 -1.25 Td [(8)11.5(.)-616.3(For studies that consider more functional approaches to the spread of su\ prana-)]TJ 0.0201 Tw 1.5 -1.25 Td (tional and/or regional units in the international economy, see Cerny 199\ 5 and)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(Ohmae 1995.)Tj 0.0074 Tc -0.00751 Tw -1.5 -1.25 Td [(9.)-626(This is not to say that these regional identi\336cations would not exist\ without rela-)]TJ 0.0063 Tc -0.00639 Tw 1.5 -1.25 Td (tion to Western Europe, but rather simply that engagement with the EU/We\ stern)Tj 0.01711 Tc 0.11411 Tw T*(Europe has been a major in\337uence on the evolution of these regional i\ denti-)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw T*(\336cations over the last decade or so.)Tj /F4 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 0 Tw 9 0 0 9 126.1811 225.8862 Tm (References)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.0078 Tc -0.0079 Tw 8 0 0 8 126.1811 212.8863 Tm (Cerny, Philip G. \(1995\). \322Globalization and the changing logic of c\ ollective action.\323)Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw 1 -1.25 Td (International Organization )Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.00571 Tc 12.048 0 Td (49, 4: 595\320625.)Tj 0.0031 Tc -0.0032 Tw -13.048 -1.25 Td (Krasner, Stephen \(1978\). )Tj /F3 1 Tf 0.00301 Tc 11.7924 0 Td (Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and)Tj 0.0056 Tc -0.00571 Tw -10.7924 -1.25 Td (U.S. Foreign Policy)Tj /F2 1 Tf 8.1293 0 Td (. 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